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Abstract 
In this study, we examine whether theoretically inconsistent foreign bond allocations are 
associated with economic fundamentals and/or non-economic behavioural factors. Using 
panel data for 54 developed and emerging markets spanning a temporal period of 12 years, 
the results show that non-economic factors, i.e. familiarity with foreign markets and 
behavioural characteristics of source markets, are the stronger drivers of biases in foreign 
bond allocations. Further, using the recent 2009-11 European sovereign debt crisis as an 
experimental set-up, we find that investors reduce their foreign bond allocations during the 
debt crisis, with the withdrawals being more severe from the most affected countries. We also 
find that the relevance of familiarity with foreign markets becomes more pronounced during 
the European debt crisis. However, in case of the recent 2007-09 global financial crisis, we 
find no evidence of change in foreign bias by international bond investors.  
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1. Introduction 
Although contrary to finance theory, it is well established that portfolio investors overinvest 
in their domestic markets and underinvest in foreign markets, leading to investment biases. 
Most of the existing studies explaining these biases focus on equity investments, particularly 
explaining the cross-country differences in overweighting of domestic equities, referred to as 
equity home bias (Cooper and Kaplanis 1994; Grinblatt and Keloharju 2001). The issue of 
underweighting of foreign markets, referred to as foreign bias,1 has received much less 
attention, is focused mainly on equity investments (Chan et al 2005; Beugelsdijk and Frijns 
2010) and there is disagreement on the possible causes. For the first time to our knowledge, 
we explore the relative relevance of ecnomic and non-economic determinants of biases in 
foreign bond investments, examining their behaviour during the global financial and 
European debt crises.  
In addition to filling the research opportunities on foreign bias, particularly on bonds, 
our study on the international allocation of bonds is also motivated by the importance, 
development and characteristics of the bond market. The size of global bond markets is 
roughly twice the size of equity markets2. Further, it has witnessed steady growth in the past 
decade, as debt has become an important source of finance for governments, financial 
institutions and corporates.3 Despite such significant increases in the absolute dollar value of 
cross-border bond investments, the data reveals that bond investors are still not diversifying 
internationally to benefit from the optimal risk-return trade-off.   
Bonds also have unique characteristics relative to equity as asset class, and therefore 
the underlying determinants of bond foreign biases could be different from that observed in 
                                                          
1 In this paper, we denote relatively higher foreign investment in a foreign market as positive foreign bias and 
relatively lower foreign investment in a foreign market as negative foreign bias.  
2 See McKinsey and Company (2011) for comparative size of equity and debt markets. 
3 Data from Bank for International Settlements (BIS) show that bond market size increased from USD 35.5 
trillion in year 2001 to USD 97.5 trillion in 2012. During the corresponding period, cross-border holdings of 
long-term debt (excluding money market instruments) grew from USD 5.5 trillion to USD 19.8 trillion, as 
reported by International Monetary Fund (IMF) in its Coordinate Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS). 
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equity investments. For example, compared to equity markets, bonds exhibit lower volatility 
returns with a higher element of relative safety.4 Studies likewise show that government bond 
returns are not influenced by the same factors that impact equity returns (Elton 1999). 
Similarly, Campbell and Taksler (2003) report that the price of bonds can significantly 
diverge from that of equities, implying that different factors could drive the attractiveness of 
equities and bonds asymmetrically. These differential factors, along with their growing size 
and importance in the world economy, motivate us to examine whether it is the economic 
fundamentals or non-economic factors that are more influential in international bond 
investment bias.5 Further, there is evidence that investors do not flee volatility in equity 
markets but do take flight from volatility in bond markets (see Burger and Warnock 2003). 
Therefore, we investigate whether there were any significant reallocations of bond 
investments from countries most affected by the recent Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. 
Additionally, the setting of debt crisis along with recent global financial crisis, allows us to 
test whether the sensitivity of economic and non-economic factors is different during periods 
of economic crisis relative to non-crisis periods.   
In summary, we examine three important issues related to foreign bond investments. 
First, we investigate whether it is the economic fundamentals and/or non-economic factors 
that are associated with biases in foreign bond allocations. Second, using the 2009-11 
European sovereign debt and 2007-09 global financial crises as experimental set-ups, we 
investigate whether investors reallocate/rebalance their bond portfolio during these turbulent 
economic periods. Third, we examine whether the crises periods interact with economic and 
non-economic factors and their effect on driving biases in foreign bond allocations. 
                                                          
4 Government bonds, as of 2011, occupy approximately 45% of global bond market (McKinsey and Company 
2011). 
5 We uVHWKHWHUPµQRQ-HFRQRPLF¶LQDQDUURZVHQVHWRLQFOXGH bilateral familiarity and source country-specific 
behavioural factors unless there is a need to discuss these two categories separately. As discussed in Section 2.2, 
we capture bilateral familiarity using country-pair language, distance, and trade (see Chan et al 2005). Our 
source country-specific behavioural factors are related to uncertainty avoidance and masculinity.  
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 Using an extensive dataset on cross-border bond allocations for 54 markets 
(developed and emerging) spanning 12 years, two important findings emerge from our study. 
First, though economic fundamentals and non-economic factors (including familiarity and 
behavioural factors) both are important drivers of foreign bias, we find that familiarity, which 
tends to lower information acquisition costs with foreign markets, is the predominant driver 
of foreign bias. Given the lower volatility of bond market, the premium attached by foreign 
investors for economic fundamentals (including institutional factors) seems to be of 
secondary importance relative to familiarity with foreign markets. Further, in addition to the 
bilateral familiarity factors, non-economic investor-specific behavioural attributes also offer 
interesting insights in the allocations decisions of cross-country bond investments. We find 
that investors with higher levels of uncertainty avoidance consistently underweight foreign 
bond markets. In contrast, investors with higher levels of masculinity, a proxy for 
competitiveness, have greater allocation of funds invested in foreign bonds.  
Second, during the 2007-09 global financial crisis we find no statistical evidence of 
lower foreign bond diversification from all foreign countries. This can be explained by the 
global systematic nature of the crisis, where foreign bond markets were not as severely 
affected globally (in comparison to other asset classes) and with respect to individual regions 
or countries. However, when we include the period spanning the European debt crisis and in 
particular, focus on the markets most severely affected, i.e. Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal 
and Spain (GIIPS), we find that foreign investors divest their share of relative allocations 
from the markets suffering most from the European debt crisis. Further, we also find that the 
importance of non-economic factors in explaining foreign bias is even greater during the 
European debt crisis, even after controlling for economic factors.  
Our study contributes to the following three strands of the literature. First, we add to the 
limited literature on international bond portfolio diversification. To the best of our 
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knowledge, this is the first study to simultaneously investigate the relative importance of 
economic fundamentals versus behaviourally influenced non-economic factors in explaining 
foreign biases in international bond allocations.6 Second, we also supplement the literature 
which associates the role of cultural attitude with foreign investment decisions (see Grinblatt 
and Keloharju, 2001, Graham et al., 2009 amongst others). Specially, we show how investor-
specific cultural factors can influence foreign bond allocation decisions. Finally, we also 
contribute to the growing literature linking crisis periods and investor behaviour (Malmendier 
and Nagel 2011). We consider both the period of global financial crisis (2007-09) and the 
European sovereign debt crisis (2009-11) to examine how these periods influence foreign 
bias in international bond investment. Additionally, we consider whether the sensitivities of 
economic and non-economic factors can alter during the economic crisis periods relative to 
non-crisis periods. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The following section contains a brief 
discussion on the theoretical framework and possible determinants of foreign bias with their 
economic explanations. The subsequent section describes the data and variables. After this 
we provide the empirical analysis, and the final section concludes the paper.  
 
2. Deadweight Costs and Investment Biases 
Our theoretical framework is drawn from Cooper and Kaplanis (1986). The framework 
stipulates that investors, assuming that they intend to maximize their return for a given level 
                                                          
6 2XUVWXG\WKRXJKUHODWHGEXWLVGLIIHUHQWIURP'H0RRUDQG9DQSHH¶VSDSHUKHUHDIWHUUHIHUUHGWRDV
DMV) on three fronts. First, our focus is on relative impact of economic and non-economic factors in bond bias. 
Another important dimension in our paper is the inclusion of cultural attitudes of investors (which is absent in 
DMV) because investors are known to make decisions based on their personal or societal traits (see Chui and 
Kwok, 2008; Graham et al., 2009; Kaplanski et al., 2015; Kirkman et al., 2006; Kwok and Tadesse, 2006). 
Finally, DMV examine equity and bond bias over 10 years without allowing for crisis periods. We focus on 
normal as well as economically turbulent crisis periods (both global financial crisis and Eurozone debt crisis) to 
enhance our understanding of the impact of different factors during these different times and provide some 
interesting results. We include additional tests related to this by segregating the data between EMU markets and 
non-EMU markets.  
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of risk, hold the world market portfolio in the absence of deadweight costs, i.e. when all 
investors are not hindered by any form of barrier to invest in foreign markets. However, the 
presence of direct and indirect barriers to international investments, that generates marginal 
deadweight costs, translates into deviations from the world market portfolio. We segregate 
the factors driving bond investment biases into two categories. The first group is related to 
economic fundamentals and the second to non-economic factors. Economic fundamentals are 
linked to country-specific economic and institutional factors and non-economic issues are 
associated with information asymmetry and irrationality issues. We describe all the variables 
we use in our empirical analysis in Table I, explaining both economic  and non-economic 
factors. 
[Insert Table ,KHUH«@ 
2.1. Economic Factors,Bond Allocation and Foreign Bias   
To capture different dimensions of economic drivers of bond allocations, we use a wide range 
of economic fundamentals. These include returns on bond investments, foreign exchange 
risks, bond market development, investor protection standards, explicit barriers of formal 
capital control, and other macroeconomic factors (See Chan et al 2005; Bekaert and Wang 
2009; Forbes 2010). Following our theoretical framework, we expect attractive features of 
foreign markets to reduce deadweight costs for investors thus leading to higher foreign bias. 
On the contrary, less attractive characteristics of a host market would lead to higher 
deadweight cost leading to lower foreign bias.  
In terms of bond returns, the tendency of investors seeking higher returns by 
increasing holdings in well-performing assets has been widely examined (Chan et al 2005; 
Curcuru et al 2011). Based on this argument it is expected that recent higher market returns 
would motivate investors to increase their bond holding in that market, leading to higher 
foreign bias.   
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Exchange rate volatility can increase deadweight costs for international investors (if 
bonds are issued in an overseas currency). Fidora et al (2007) find that investors are more 
likely to invest more in their domestic markets than investing abroad when faced with higher 
foreign exchange volatility. We anticipate that the higher exchange rate of a host market 
would make it less attractive for international bond investors, thus leading to lower foreign 
bias in that market.  
Differential levels of bond market development across the globe can also generate 
deadweight costs for investors. Forbes (2010) finds that D FRXQWU\¶V ILQDQFLDO PDUNHW
development positively influences foreign investment, as a well-developed market offers 
enhanced liquidity and efficiency. This suggests that a well-developed foreign market can 
attract international bond investors resulting in higher foreign bias. 
 With respect to investor protection, La Porta et al (1997) demonstrate that countries 
offering a lower level of investor protection have less developed capital markets lacking the 
optimal breadth and depth. Similarly, Bae et al (2006) find that foreigners invest more in 
ERQGV RI WKRVH FRXQWULHV WKDW VDIHJXDUG LQYHVWRUV¶ SURSHUW\ ULJKWV As a result, within our 
framework, the higher degree of investor protection standards in a host market generates 
lower degree of deadweight costs for international bond investors, thus leading to higher 
foreign bias. 
Although capital controls have been progressively relaxed over the past few decades 
(McLeavy and Solnik 2014), the degree of openness still varies across countries. Higher 
levels of capital control impose limits on foreign investors on their investments in national 
markets (Ahearne et al 2004). This implies that relaxing capital account restrictions and 
easing existing barriers to capital inflows would increase foreign investments in a given 
market (Chan et al 2005; Forbes 2010). Therefore we expect a higher level of capital 
openness to be associated with higher foreign bias. 
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Macroeconomic imbalances and, financial and political risks could also explain 
foreign biases as they are associated with generating higher deadweight costs to foreign 
investors (Bekaert et al 2014; Afonso et al 2015). For instance, Eurozone countries struggling 
to bring their budget deficits within agreed levels could be indicators of future shocks in their 
bond markets, making those host countries less attractive for bond investors. To control for a 
wide spectrum of such risks, not included in other variables, we add country credit ratings in 
our analysis. We expect that higher country risk should discourage foreign investors leading 
to lower foreign bias. 
2.2.  Non-economic Factors, Bond Allocation and Foreign Bias 
It is suggested that higher familiarity of an asset/market leads to more investment in that 
asset/market (Huberman 2001). However, there is no conclusive consensus as to whether the 
effect of such familiarity is rational or irrational. For example, Chan et al (2005) equate 
higher familiarity to lower information costs, measuring the varying degree of information 
asymmetry between home and foreign investors, whereas Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) 
associate familiarity bias with irrationality. Earlier  studies (Heath and Tversky 1991) also 
lend support to the non-economic and non-rational aspect of  familiarity where investors are 
more optimistic about domestic asset returns as they feel less competent to evaluate foreign 
assets. Given the disagreement in segregating the familiarity and behavioural issues, in this 
study we use several country-pair and source country investor-specific factors capturing the 
GLIIHUHQW VRXUFHV RI IDPLOLDULW\ DQGRU LUUDWLRQDOLW\ XQGHU WKH FRPPRQ KHDGLQJ RI ³non-
economic factors´ 
We are motivated to treat the bilateral pair country factors separately from economic 
fundamentals for two reasons. First, all the economic fundamentals are country-specific and 
the familiarity explanations are country-pair dependent. Second, all economic fundamentals 
are expected to impact investment biases directly on their own, but the bilateral links are 
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expected to influence investment biases indirectly through familiarity with foreign markets. 
The first two factors we use are the geographic proximity between source and host countries 
and a dummy variable reflecting whether investors share a common language in the country-
pair.  In terms of distance, Chan et al (2005) suggest that international investors are more 
reluctant to invest in countries that are relatively further away. Higher geographical distance 
creates larger deadweight costs arising from lower familiarity, which in turn leads to lower 
foreign bias (i.e. less favourable foreign allocations). A similar argument applies to common 
language, however  the impact is in the reverse direction, as sharing a common language with 
a foreign market helps in enhancing familiarity of host market thus motivating higher 
allocations (see Grinblatt and Keloharju 2001; Cuypers et al 2015). Therefore we expect bond 
investors to favour foreign markets that share a common language. The third factor known to 
capture time-varying degree of familiarity between country pairs is bilateral trade (Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti 2008). The flow of information through trade increases familiarity with 
partner countries and therefore would increase foreign bias.  
We complement the bilateral familiarity factors with two source country-specific 
behavioural factors. The first is related to varying level of uncertainty avoidance among 
investors from different countries, and WKHVHFRQG IDFWRU LV DVVRFLDWHGZLWK LQYHVWRUV¶drive 
for competitiveness and material rewards. Countries where investors have higher levels of 
uncertainty avoidance are known to have greater bank-dominated (less risky) financial 
markets, whereas countries with lower levels of uncertainty avoidance are known to be more 
market-dominated (more risky) (Kwok and Tadesse 2006). Empirically, Anderson et al 
(2011) find that countries with higher levels of uncertainty aversion diversify less in foreign 
equities, but they do not find outsiders being influenced by such behavioural characteristics 
of host country investors. On a similar note, Beugelsdijk and Frijns (2010) show that more 
uncertainty avoiding countries invest lower amounts in foreign equities, which is more 
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pronounced for emerging markets. In summary, existing empirical evidence suggests that 
investors from countries that have relatively higher levels of uncertainty-aversion would be 
less inclined to invest in unfamiliar assets abroad and therefore underweight foreign bonds.  
The second investor-specific behavioural factor is associated with the general view 
that some societies tend to be more competitive, assertive and reward-seeking than others 
(Hofstede 1980). Intuitively, investors from societies that place more preference to 
competition and material rewards should be more inclined to venture out of familiar territory 
in search of greater rewards. Empirical evidence also suggests that investors from such 
competitive and reward-seeking societies exhibit higher levels of foreign equity 
diversification, possibly because they perceive themselves to possess better information about 
foreign markets (Anderson et al 2011). Graham et al (2009) also show that investors who feel 
more competent invest a larger portion of their wealth in foreign assets. In line with this view 
we suggest that the tendency of a society to be more competitive, aggressive, and reward-
seeking can drive investors to invest more in (foreign) markets they are less familiar with, 
and this might partially explain the biases observed in international bond diversification.  
 
3.  Data 
In this section is we discuss our data and the construction of the variables that captures 
different aspects of economic and non-economic factors. 
3.1. Measure of Foreign Bias  
The construction of a foreign bias measure needs market level crossborder bond portfolio 
holdings and bond market size data. Crossborder bond holdings data are obtained from Co-
ordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) of International Monetary Fund. After cleaning 
the data7 and based on the availability of data on bond market size, our yearly average 
                                                          
6 The CPIS database has been used by Bekaert and Wang (2009) and Lau et al (2010) amongst others. However, 
a few caveats need to be noted in using the CPIS data set. For example, investment from some countries, 
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crossborder holdings figure over the sample period is approximately US$10 trillion. Our 
sample includes 54 of the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) designated 
developed, emerging and frontier markets for the period of 2001-2012.8 In terms of temporal 
range in our sample, the cross-border bond holdings increased from US$3.7 trillion in 2001 to 
US$14.3 trillion in 2012. Further, the total cross-border investments received by our sample 
countries comprises of 76%  of the average total holdings (US$120 trillion for 2001-12 from 
a total of US$158 trillion) reported by CPIS. Therefore we suggest that our sample is 
representative of the aggregate global bond market portfolio investments. 
Following Fidora et al (2007), bond market size is taken from Table 14B, 16A and 18 
from Debt Securities Statistics provided by BIS. Table 14B relates to all outstanding 
international bonds and notes, excluding money market instruments, issued by domestic 
issuers. Table 16A provides figures on outstanding domestic debt securities issued by 
domestic residents and Table 18 includes figures on total debt securities (domestic and 
international) issued by domestic residents. In case of difference in amount between table 18 
and combined 14B plus 16A, we take the higher of the two. The average yearly global 
outstanding bond market figure for the sample countries is US$63.8 trillion, with a temporal 
variation  of US$35.5 trillion in 2001 to US$97.5 trillion in 2012. 
To construct the foreign bias measures, we need to first compute the bilateral 
allocation made by investors from source country i into bond portfolio issued by host country 
j for the period t as shown in the equation (1) below: 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(notably China) are not reported; some investments are shown as negative values; a small sample is reported as 
XQDOORFDWHG VRPHGDWD LV UHSRUWHGDVFRQILGHQWLDODQG LQYHVWPHQWV IURPµLQWHUQDWLRQDO RUJDQL]DWLRQV¶DUHDOVR
reported. For the purpose of foreign bias, we ignore the negative and unallocated cross-border investments. 
Following the suggestion of Cooper et al (2012) we replace all zero international investment as USD 1 to ensure 
that complete underinvestment in host markets are not ignored.  
8 The coverage of our sample period is dictated by the availability of data. For example, data on bond market 
development and capital openness is not yet available for the year 2013. 
 ݓ௜௝௧ ൌ  ܤܪ௜௝௧ ෍ ܤܪ௜௝௧ହସ௝ୀଵ൘  (1)  
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where ݓ௜௝௧ is the share of host country (݆ ) in bond holdings for investors of source country 
(݅) and ܤܪ௜௝௧ is the market value of bond holdings of country ݆ in the portfolio of country ݅¶V
investors as reported by CPIS for period t. Next, the benchmark weight  of country ݆ in the 
world market portfolio is calculated in equation (2) as follows: 
where ݓ௝௧כ  is the share of country ݆ in world bond market and ܯ ௝ܸ௧ is the bond market 
outstanding of country ݆ for the period t as obtained from BIS. We follow Chan et al (2005) 
to calculate foreign bias measure for each country pair. Foreign bias (ܨܤܫܣܵ௜௝௧), as defined 
in equation (3) below, is the extent to which investors from source country (i) overweight or 
underweight foreign markets (݆) in their bond holdings and is computed as the log ratio of ݓ௜௝௧ to ݓ௝௧כ . In our empirical tests higher foreign bias indicates more weight of the host 
market. 
3.2. Economic Variables 
We use real annual yield (YLD), net of sovereign default risk premium and expected 
inflation, as a measure of bond returns. The annual yield on ten-year government bond is 
computed as the preceding twelve months average yield. The data is obtained primarily from 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) of IMF. For some countries where this data is not 
available in IFS, we collect this data from Economic Intelligence Unit. Inflation figures 
(http://www.eiu.com/), based on CPI index, are from World Development Indicators (WDI) 
of the World Bank and sovereign default risk VSUHDGV EDVHG RQ 0RRG\¶V UDWLQJV DUH WDNHQ
from Damodaran¶VZHEVLWHFor five countries where local currency yields are not available 
from either source, we use yields from USD-denominated debt taken IURP -3 0RUJDQ¶V
 ݓ௝௧כ ൌ  ܯ ௝ܸ௧ ෍ ܯ ௝ܸ௧ହସ௝ୀଵ൘  (2)  
 ܨܤܫܣ ௜ܵ௝௧ ൌ ൬ݓ௜௝௧ ݓ௝௧כ൘ ൰ (3)  
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EMBI series net of country risk and US inflation.9 To capture exchange rate volatility 
(EXCH), we use the 61-country trade-weighted and inflation-adjusted broad monthly indices 
for real effective exchange rate from BIS with year 2010 as the base year. We calculate 
yearly volatility as percentage change in the indices per year based on the preceding 36 
months data. In all our regressions, we take the natural log of exchange rate volatility for a 
given country.  
To capture the overall bond market development, we use the sum of private domestic 
bonds and private international bonds taken as a share of GDP as a proxy for bond market 
development (BDEV) and use it in its logarithmic form in our empirical analysis.10 The data 
is sourced from Global Financial Development Database developed by Cihak et al (2013).11 
Our measure of property rights (PROP) is from Table 2c of Economic Freedom Network 
(EFN) (freetheworld.com/datasets_efw.html) compiled by Gwartney et al (2014) and ranges 
from 1 to 10. Lower score implies that rights over financial and other assets are poorly 
defined and not properly protected by law whereas higher score represents clear definition 
and enhanced protection of such rights. As a measure of capital controls, we use the openness 
index (CAPOP) from the Table 4Dii of EFN. This measure ranges from 0-10, and is 
constructed on the basis of 13 different types of international capital controls measures 
reported in the various issues of Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions of IMF. A higher score reflects higher level of capital openness. Country risk 
(CRISK) PHDVXUHLVEDVHGRQ0RRG\¶VUatings and ranges from 0 to 1000 basis points with 
higher score representing higher risk. Following earlier studies (Eichengreen and Mody 2000; 
Cruces and Trebesch 2013), we do not use the absolute values, but regress such credit ratings 
                                                          
9 The five countries are Argentina, Egypt, Indonesia, Turkey and Ukraine. Excluding these five countries from 
our sample does not change the findings of this paper. 
10 Burger and Warnock (2003) and Forbes (2010) use ratio of domestic bond market capitalization to GDP as a 
measure of overall bond market development. However, ignoring the international component of bond issuances 
ignores an important element of overall development of the bond market. 
11 This data is available only for the period 2000 to 2011. However, since the temporal variation over any two 
year period is not significantly material, we use the data from 2011 for the year 2012. 
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against all the other economic fundamentals and use the residuals in our equations. This 
residual captures all the other country-specific time-varying factors that we have not included 
in our set of economic variables but are used by credit rating agencies to assess the riskiness 
of the country. 
3.3. Non-Economic Variables 
Geographical proximity is measured by distance (DIST) in kilometres between capital cities 
of country pairs and is from Gleditsch (2014, www.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/) (natural logarithmic 
form in all regressions).12 Common language (COMLA) is a dummy variable with a value of 
one if a country pair shares major language with another country, taken from Wei and 
Subramaniyan (2007) (http://users.nber.org/~wei/data.html, VHH µ'DWDVHW . Bilateral trade 
(BILTR) is the weight in international trade assigned to a given country by its partner 
countries. Figures on bilateral trade, including both exports and imports, are taken from IMF 
Direction of Trade Statistics.  
For measures of source country-specific uncertainty avoidance, we take country level 
scores for uncertainty avoidance (UNTAV) from Hofstede (1980).13 It measures the extent to 
which individuals in the country feel uncomfortable with ambiguous and uncertain situations. 
This measure is based on a scale of 0-100 with higher score indicating higher level of 
tendency to avoid uncertain and ambiguous situations.14 To measure the degree of 
competitiveness and reward-seeking tendency prevalent in a society, we use the country score 
for masculinity (MASC), also from Hofstede (1980). Higher score on this dimension implies 
that the society has an affinity for more assertiveness, competition, achievement, and heroism 
(Hofstede 1980). Lower score of masculinity would be closer to feminine values associated 
                                                          
12 This information on distance in this database is very similar to that of Wei and Subramaniyan (2007) but 
covers a wider range of country pairs. 
13 +RIVWHGH¶V VWXGLHV although not without criticism, are considered to be the most widely cited studies in 
measurement of cultures, see Kwok and Tadesse (2006) for a discussion. 
14 As additional robustness test, we also use similar data from Global Leadership and Organizational Behaviour 
Effectiveness (GLOBE) study of House et al (2004) . GLOBE provides two measures of uncertainty avoidance: 
RQHUHODWHGWRµYDOXHV¶DQGWKHRWKHUUHODWHGWRµSUDFWLFH¶:HWDNHWKHXQFHUWDLQW\DYRLGDQFHPHDVXUHUHODWHGWR
YDOXHVDVLWLVSRVLWLYHO\FRUUHODWHGZLWK+RIVWHGH¶VPHDVXUH. 
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with social caring and cooperation. This measure ranges from 0-100, with higher values 
reflecting higher level of competitive social tendencies. 
4. Empirical Results 
We begin the discussion of empirical results by exploring average figures of all the variables. 
The averages are discussed on individual country basis and by grouping the countries based 
on level of market development. We follow the summary analysis with the discussion on 
various regression results. 
4.1. Summary Statistics  
The average yearly summary statistics of key variables are shown in Table II for all the 54 
countries in our sample spanning a period of 2001 to 2012.15 Average foreign bias (FBIAS)  
towards a  host country ሺ݆ሻ from all source countries (݅) is higher for developed markets (-
3.93) compared to emerging markets (-6.37). Notably, the top nine host countries with 
highest level of foreign bias are developed markets and nine out of the bottom ten are 
emerging markets.16 Unsurprisingly the differences in average figures suggest that investors 
seem to prefer to invest in developed market relative to their emerging counterparts. 
[Insert Table II KHUH«@ 
With respect to the fundamental variables, we note significant differences between the 
developed and emerging markets. The yearly average real yield (YLD) for developed markets 
is 1.75 percent and for emerging markets is 1.24 percent. It is evident that developed markets 
sovereign bonds are yielding higher real UHWXUQV FRPSDUHG WR WKHLU HPHUJLQJ PDUNHWV¶
counterparts. This supports our conjecture that foreign investors are attracted by higher real 
returns. Such differences suggest a positive relation between foreign bias and real return. As 
                                                          
15 Data for some countries is partially missing. There are four countries (Bahrain, Kazakhstan, Mauritius and 
Ukraine) which will not be included in any regression as they have missing values in both economic and non-
economic categories. However, they are still reported as they are used to construct our foreign bias measure. 
16 The top nine countries with the highest foreign bias are (from high to low) Netherlands, United Kingdom, 
Germany, France, Ireland, United States, Austria, Finland, and Sweden. The bottom nine countries with the 
lowest foreign bias (from high to low) are Kuwait, Bahrain, Indonesia, Egypt, Israel, Thailand, Mauritius, 
Lebanon, and Pakistan. 
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expected, the exchange rate volatility (EXCH) for developed markets (4.16 percent) is lower 
than that of emerging markets (7.57 percent). Average bond market development (BDEV) for 
our entire sample is 62.8 percent of GDP with developed markets (95.9 percent) showing 
considerably higher level of development than emerging markets (16 percent). Similarly, and 
as expected, developed countries have higher scores in terms of protection of property rights 
(PROP) and capital openness (CAPOP) and they also register significantly lower country risk 
(CRISK). 
In terms of our measures related to non-economic drivers, the common language 
(COMLA) average figure of 0.18 for developed markets implies that they share official 
language with more partner countries compared to the smaller figure of 0.14 for emerging 
markets.  These figures are particularly driven by the proximity of European countries. With 
regards to trade, on average, countries in our sample conduct 4.2 percent of their overall 
bilateral trade (BILTR) with individual developed markets as compared to 1.3 percent with 
individual emerging markets. This further signifies that developed markets are economically 
more integrated with world markets relative to emerging markets. With respect to the source 
country-specific behavioural factors, though developed markets exhibit lower level of 
uncertainty avoidance (UNTAV) than the emerging markets, the scores for masculinity 
(MASC) are similar. The figure of 59 (on a scale of 0-100) for UNTAV 17 indicates that 
investors from developed markets are less likely to avoid uncertain situations relative to 
investors from emerging markets, as reflected by the figure of 71. Apart from MASC, 
differences between developed and emerging markets in all the variables are significant at 99 
percent confidence level. The similar score for MASC for both the markets suggests that 
competitiveness and reward-seeking societal attitudes are not the exclusive preserves of 
either developed or emerging markets. 
                                                          
17 We find similar observations using GLOBE study (House et al 2004) where developed markets have lower 
score for uncertainty avoidance (4.1 on a scale of 3.2 to 5.6) as compared to emerging markets (4.9). 
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In summary, on average, countries with higher foreign bias are associated with higher 
recent return, lower exchange rate volatility, better developed markets, markets with higher 
level of property rights protection, more open capital markets, closer proximity with investor 
countries, higher share of common language and bilateral trading. In general,  our summary 
statistics are consistent with our expectations. In the following section, we present our  
regression analysis on the association between foreign bias and the different measures of 
economic and non-economic factors. 
4.2. Regression Results 
Drawing on the theoretical framework, the general regression specification for modelling 
foreign bias (ܨܾ݅ܽݏ௜௝௧) in international bond allocations is shown in equation (4):  
where ܨݑ݊ ௝݀௧ is the vector of host country-specific (i.e. country j) economic fundamental 
variables, ܨܽ݉௜௝௧ is a vector of bilateral familiarity variables between home and host 
countries, and ܤ݄݁ܽݒ௜௧ is a vector of the two behavioural variables specific to source country 
investors. Following Chan et al (2005), an additional variable, inverse of source country bias 
(INSB = 1 ± Domestic Bias), is included to allow for the fact that a higher investment at 
home, i.e. source country i,  relative to the theory would automatically lower foreign 
investments of investors in source countries. For instance, if a country invests 90% of its total 
bond holdings in domestic bonds, this obviously means that there is that lower proportion of 
funds available to invest abroad. Domestic bias (ܦܤ௜௧) is defined as log ratio of domestic 
allocations of source investors to the world benchmark as shown below in equation (5): 
 ܨܾ݅ܽݏ௜௝௧ ൌ ߚଵܨݑ݊ ௝݀௧ ൅ ߚଶܨܽ݉௜௝௧ ൅ ߚଷܤ݄݁ܽݒ௜ ൅ ߚସܫܰܵܤ௜௧ ൅ ߚହߙ௧ ൅ ߚ଺ߙ௝ ൅ ߳௜௝௧ (4)  
 ܦܤ௜௧ ൌ ൬ݓ௜௧ ݓ௜௧כൗ ൰ (5)  
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where ݓ௜௧ is the domestic allocations of investors in source country i which is constructed as 
ratio of domestic holdings to total bond holdings. Domestic allocations are computed in 
equation (6) as follows:  
Domestic holdings by investors in country i are computed as the difference between 
total domestic bond market outstanding values, as reported by BIS, and total bond holdings of 
country i by foreign investors, as reflected in the data from CPIS. Total  global bond holdings 
by investors in country i is the sum of total domestic and international bond holdings by 
investors in country i. The benchmark weight (ݓ௜௧כ )  of country ݅ in the world market portfolio 
is calculated in equation (7) as follows: 
where ݓ௜௧כ  is the share of country ݅ in world bond market and ܯ ௜ܸ௧ is the bond market value 
outstanding figure of country ݅ for the period t as obtained from BIS. Finally, ߙ௧, in equation 
(4) are year dummies and ߙ௝ are host country dummies. Due to time-constant nature of four 
of our variables of interest (i.e. DIST, COMLA, UNTAV, and MASC), use of panel (country-
pair) fixed effects in a dynamic panel setting is not desirable. Hence, in the spirit of existing 
studies (e.g. Portes and Rey, 2005; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2008), we include host country 
fixed effects. The mitigating factor is that panel-level variables that are constant over time 
(e.g. DIST, COMLA) will pick up some of the fixed effects for the panels (see Portes and 
Rey, 2005). The regression results are reported with standard errors corrected at panel level 
clustering (i.e. country-pair level) using the White (1980) method.  
Table III reports the results from different model specifications with our expected sign 
for  the coefficients. Model I shows the estimates with only economic fundamentals and host 
country dummies in the regression. All fundamental factors enter the regression with 
 ݓ௜௧ ൌ ݀݋݉݁ݏݐ݅ܿܾ݋݊݀݄݋݈݀݅݊݃ݏܾݕ݅݊ݒ݁ݏݐ݋ݎݏ݅݊ܿ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕ݅ݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ݈݃݋ܾ݈ܽܾ݋݊݀݄݋݈݀݅݊݃ݏܾݕ݅݊ݒ݁ݏݐ݋ݎݏ݅݊ܿ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕ݅ (6)  
 ݓ௜௧כ ൌ  ܯ ௜ܸ௧ ෍ ܯ ௜ܸ௧ହସ௜ୀଵ൘  (7)  
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expected signs and are significant at least at the 1% level.18 The positive regression 
coefficient of YLD suggests that investors are more inclined to invest in markets experiencing 
recent higher real return providing support to investors seeking higher returns.19 EXCH with a 
negative coefficient reflects the expected inverse association between exchange rate volatility 
and foreign bias. This relation implies that international bond investors tend to avoid markets 
with higher exchange rate volatility, consistent with the findings of Fidora et al (2007). 
Similarly, from the positive sign of BDEV coefficients we can infer that investors are 
motivated to invest more in markets with higher level of bond market development.  Property 
rights (PROP) and capital openness (CAPOP) also show statistically significant relation in 
the expected direction. Any remaining country-specific macroeconomic, political and 
financial risks (CRISK), as expected, exhibit negative association with foreign bias.  
Model II presents results for foreign bias regressed against the five non-economic 
variables, i.e. three bilateral familiarity and two source country-specific behavioural 
variables, and host country dummies. All the variables bear the expected signs and are 
significant at the 1% level. The negative sign of DIST suggests that investors avoid markets 
which are further away from them geographically. Similarly, the positive coefficient 
associated with language indicates that common language (COMLA) with a host country is 
positively associated with foreign bias. For bilateral trade (BILTR), the positive coefficient 
reflects that higher trade conducted by a trading partner promotes foreign bias in the trading 
partner markets. With respect to source country-specific behavioural factors, the negative 
coefficient suggests that higher level of uncertainty avoidance (UNTAV) leads to lower 
                                                          
18 Although we explain the regression coefficients in its qualitative terms only, given the cross-country set-up of 
our investigation, the quantitative effects of the results should be interpreted with due caution. 
19 $V DQ DOWHUQDWLYH PHDVXUH RI ERQG UHWXUQV ZH DOVR WDNH -3 0RUJDQ¶V (0%, JOREDO VHULHV IRU HPHUJLQJ
markets and long-term government bond yields for developed markets from Datastream. We also adjust the 
bond yields of target countries by applying average exchange rate for the year from the perspective of investing 
countries. These alternative figures yield qualitatively similar results. 
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foreign bias in foreign countries, which is in line with behavioural theory expectation.20 On 
the other hand, a higher level of masculinity (MASC) is positively associated with more 
foreign bias. This positive association is also in line with our expectation and supports the 
findings of Graham et al (2009) and Anderson et al (2011). This provides support to the 
notion that more competitive, assertive and reward-seeking investors have the tendency to 
invest more in less familiar foreign assets.  
Model III considers all the economic and non-economic variables included 
simultaneously in the regression. The direction of association exhibited by all the variables 
remains essentially unchanged. Out of the eleven variables of interest, nine still exhibit 
statistical significance at the 1% level with the remaining two significant at 5% levels. We 
introduce control variables in Model IV in the form of inverse home bias of source country 
(INSB), and year fixed effects. INSB exhibits a statistically significant positive coefficient 
supporting the view that countries with lower domestic bias exhibit more foreign bias in 
international bond markets. Even after controlling for host country specific time-invariant 
variables and allowing for temporal variation in our dependent variable, the coefficients of 
our key explanatory variables remain qualitatively the same. The introduction of the control 
variables enhances the explanatory power (adjusted R-squared of 0.34) and eight out of the 
eleven key variables remain significant at 1% level with the other three significant at 
conventional levels. 
The overall results in Table III suggest that, among the economic fundamentals, high 
real yields, better developed bond markets, higher level of capital openness and better 
protection of property rights of host markets attract foreign investors, while higher exchange 
rate volatility is a deterrent for international bond investors. As regards to non-economic 
factors, geographic distance acts as a natural barrier to foreign bias while common language 
                                                          
20 As noted earlier, wH UHSODFH +RIVWHGH¶V PHDVXUH ZLWK WKDW RI */2%( 7KH FRHIILFLHQWV DUH VLPLODU
economically and statistically. To conserve space we do not report the results but could be requested from the 
authors. 
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and bilateral trade are conducive to foreign bias. Additionally, uncertainty-avoiding investors 
are reluctant to diversify their bond holdings internationally and investors from more 
assertive and competitive societies (proxied by masculinity) tend to exhibit higher level of 
foreign bias, even after controlling for economic fundamentals. To account for the possible 
persistence of FBIAS across country-pairs, we use a dynamic panel model in the spirit of 
Arellano and Bond (1991) using one-year lag of FBIAS as an additional dependent variable 
and assuming all other variables to be exogenous. All time-constant variables drops out but 
the remaining variables possess expected signs and all are significant at conventional levels 
(results available on request). 
 [Insert Table III KHUH«@ 
4.3. Horse Race between Economic and Non-Economic Factors 
We examine the relative importance between economic and non-economic factors using three 
different metrics. First, we compare the adjusted R-squared of the regressions that include 
economic and non-economic variables, followed by variance decomposition analysis, and 
then using standardized beta figures. Results in Table III show that the R-squared of non-
economic variables is 0.28 compared to 0.08 for economic fundamentals (Model I and II).21  
This provides a strong indication towards the higher explanatory power inherent in the non-
economic variables, as compared to economic fundamentals, in explaining the variance in 
foreign bias.  
To further examine the relative importance of each of the variables, we perform 
variance decomposition analysis following Bekaert and Wang (2009). We produce fitted 
values ൫ܨܤ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧൯ of foreign bias from Model III (of Table III excluding country dummies) and 
calculate relative explanatory power (VARD) for each of the explanatory variables (X) using 
equation (8) below: 
                                                          
21 Exclusion of host country dummies yields adj. R-sq. of 0.21 for familiarity and 0.3 for fundamentals. 
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where ܸܣܴܦሺ௑ሻis the relative explanatory power of explanatory variable X; ߚሺ௑ሻ is the beta 
coefficient for variable X as obtained from our regression (Model III); ሺܨܤ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧ǡ ܺ௜Ȁ௝ǡ௧ሻ is 
the covariance between the fitted values ൫ܨܤ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧൯ and variable X. Finally, ሺܨܫܤ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧ሻ 
reflects the variance of the fitted values ൫ܨܤ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧൯. From the above model, VARD for a given 
explanatory variable can be either negative or positive. The sign can be different from beta 
coefficient of the given variable because VARD measures unconditional variance contribution 
while beta coefficient in the regression measures partial correlation (Bekaert and Wang 
2009).  
Table III shows that distance (DIST) and uncertainty avoidance (UNTAV) exhibit 
VARD measures of 55% and 28% respectively suggesting that more than three quarters of 
unconditional variance of foreign bias is explained by these two variables combined (total of 
VARD measures add up to unity by construction). Other variables, in the order of 
importance, are BDEV, EXCH, and MASC carrying VARD measures of 7.3, 2.7, and 2.3 
percent respectively.  Finally, and for further comparison, we also present the standardized 
regression coefficients22 for the independent variables in the final column of Table III. DIST 
and UNTAV still register the biggest impact on foreign bias with a change of one standard 
deviation in each of these two variables corresponding to reduced foreign bias by 37 and 26 
percent respectively. In summary, our data provides consistent evidence towards the notion 
that non-economic factors, particularly related to DIST and UNTAV, explain more of foreign 
bias than economic fundamentals. 
 
 
                                                          
22 All independent variables are rescaled to have a standard deviation of one and we regress the dependent 
variable against the standardized variables. 
 ܸܣܴܦሺ௑ሻ ൌ  ߚሺ௑ሻ ሺܨܤ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧ǡ ௜ܺȀ௝ǡ௧ሻሺܨܤ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧ሻ  (8)  
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4.4. Endogeneity  
Errunza (2001) notes that higher level of foreign investment can lead to reforms in local 
capital markets. This could arguably cause some of the explanatory variables that we have 
used, particularly bond market development (BDEV), capital openness (CAPOP) and 
property rights measures (PROP), to be endogenous in our regression models.23 Since bond 
yield (YLD) in our analysis is the average for the preceding 12 months and exchange rate 
volatility (EXCH) is the moving average over preceding 36 months, the issue of endogeneity 
is mitigated for these two variables. To address concerns of endogeneity for the remaining 
variables, we repeat all the variants of our basic regression model using one-year lag of the 
endogenous variables. Table IV shows that the coefficients observed after using one-year-
lagged values of endogenous variables remain qualitatively similar to our earlier results in 
Table III. As an additional test, we use factor analysis to replace all fundamental economic 
variables with a single factor (FactorFund)24 and use a one-year lag of this first component 
factor in our regression models. FactorFund is still significant (results available on request) 
indicating that our results do not suffer significantly from reverse causality.  
[Insert Table IV KHUH«@ 
4.5. Financial Centres  
We consider the possibility that institutional investors incorporated in financial centres could 
be investing on behalf of investors of many different countries. For instance, it is possible 
that institutional investors can be incorporated within certain jurisdiction, for instance purely 
for tax purposes, and investors from other countries could be investing in foreign bonds 
through such institutional investors. This creates a problem in our data by obscuring the 
actual source country of such foreign bond investments. To address this issue, we discard all 
investments originating from countries considered to be financial centres and re-run our four 
                                                          
23 This is less of a problem for familiarity variables as all of them, apart from bilateral trade, are constant over 
time.  
24 The relevant Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure is 0.69, which justifies the use of this component. 
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models in Table III. Following Chan et al (2005), we consider United States, United 
Kingdom, Switzerland, Ireland, Japan, Hong Kong and Singapore as financial centres. 
Results presented in Table V show that the overall results remain essentially the same.  
[Insert Table V KHUH«@ 
4.6. Effect of the Two Crises Periods  
Empirical evidence suggests that foreign investors avoid markets during crisis periods and 
especially countries where they do not get information transparently (Gelos and Wei 2005) 
and that outside investors tend to exhibit herding behaviour during crises (Kim and Wei 
2002). Investors often rebalance their portfolio during times of economic distress (known as 
µIOLJKW-to-VDIHW\¶DQGRU µIOLJKW-to-OLTXLGLW\¶) (Beber et al 2009). Intuitively, foreign bias can 
be expected to decrease during such crises as the investment environment is extremely 
uncertain. We segregate the time periods in our sample into two distinct periods; crisis and 
non-crisis (normal). Crisis years for our purpose include five years spanning the global 
financial crisis (2007-09) and Eurozone debt crisis (2009-11) and the remaining years are 
treated as normal times. We choose 2007 as the start of the global financial crisis in line with 
chronology of global financial crisis provided by Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.25 Our 
choice of 2009 as the start of Eurozone debt crisis is motivated by the fact that the global 
financial crisis had already peaked and had started to be transformed into sovereign debt 
crisis in the Eurozone countries by mid-2009 (Afonso et al 2015).   
We conduct a simple mean difference paired t-test to evaluate any marked changes in 
foreign bias during these two different time periods. The results are presented in Table VI. A 
significant reduction in foreign bias measure is apparent during the crises years when foreign 
bias measure decreased from -4.867 to -5.289 (Panel A). In a comparison of the foreign bias 
figures for normal times with each crisis period, we find that foreign bias measure did not 
                                                          
25 See https://www.stlouisfed.org/financial-crisis/full-timeline. A number of other studies (including 
Grammatikos and Vermeulen 2012; Kalemli-Ozcan et al 2013) also take the year 2007 as the start of the global 
financial crisis.    
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decrease at all during the global financial crisis (Panel B). In fact, there has been a slight 
increase in foreign bias during 2007-08, though the difference is not statistically significant. 
However, the period of Eurozone debt crisis witnessed a marked decline in foreign bias 
measure, which is significant (Panel C). A plausible explanation is that as the global financial 
crisis mainly impacted financial institutions, its impact on international bonds was subdued 
because of the relative safety of bonds (most of which are sovereign). However, the Eurozone 
debt crisis was an economically turbulent period with respect to uncertainty in bond 
investments.  
We develop this further, by comparing the foreign bias figures for the five GIIPS 
countries that were most severely affected by the Eurozone crisis. The results reported in 
Panel D, which are statistically significant, show that the foreign bias measure decreases by a 
greater extent in these countries. As a result, our preliminary analysis suggests that investors 
lower their foreign bond bias during international debt crises, especially in the most affected 
countries. However, given the global systematic and different nature of crisis, such 
divestment in bonds is not apparent during the global financial crisis. We conjecture that the 
prevalence of crisis in a host country serves to increase the marginal deadweight costs 
associated with investing in that country leading to under-weighting of the crisis countries by 
a greater extent.  
[Insert Table VI KHUH«@ 
To ensure robustness of these findings, we use regression analysis to re-examine the 
possible changes in foreign bias during normal times and also during the two crises. For 
Eurozone debt crisis, we create a crisis year dummy (ECrisis) (equalling 1) for the years 2009 
± 2011. Similarly for global financial crisis, we create crisis dummy GCrisis (equalling 1) for 
years 2007-08 and run a regression with the following specification in equation (9):   
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We present the results in Table VII (Model I). Confirming our earlier findings that 
foreign bias decreased significantly during the Eurozone debt crisis, ECrisis bears a negative 
sign and is statistically significant at 1% level but GCrisis shows no significant impact.  
In Model II, we add two more dummy variables to equation (9): EZone is a dummy 
variable of 1 for all Eurozone member countries (and zero otherwise) and EuZCr is a dummy 
variable of 1 for Eurozone member countries during Eurozone crisis years only. EZone has a 
positive and significant coefficient implying that Eurozone member countries, on average, 
have received higher foreign bias than other countries during normal times. However, the  
EuZCr is insignificant implying that foreign bias did not decrease significantly in Eurozone 
countries as a whole during 2009-11; this is possibly because in our sample Eurozone is 
heavily weighted by Germany and France whose bond markets have fared relatively better 
during Eurozone debt crisis. If we exclude Germany and  France, the EuZCr coefficient, as 
reported in Model III, is significant (with negative sign) suggesting that foreign bias in most 
of the Eurozone members decreased during the 2009-11 Eurozone debt crisis.  
In Model IV, we introduce a dummy variable GIIPS (equalling 1 for GIIPS countries) 
to replace EZone. Similarly, we replace EuZCr with GIIPSCr which is a dummy for GIIPS 
countries during Eurozone crisis years only. GIIPSCr is negative as expected supporting our 
earlier finding that foreign bias further decreased in GIIPS countries during Eurozone debt 
crisis even after allowing for the general decline in foreign bias during 2009-11. GIIPS does 
not exhibit significant coefficient implying that these countries did not command any higher 
preference over non-Eurozone members even during normal times (unlike other Eurozone 
countries).  To ensure robustness of this finding and to further explore if the impact on FBIAS 
were influenced by regional effects to, we segregate our data between EMU and non-EMU 
 
ܨܾ݅ܽݏ௜௝௧ ൌ ߚଵܩܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ ൅ ߚଶܧܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ ൅ ߚଷܨݑ݊ ௝݀௧ ൅ ߚସܨܽ݉௜௝௧ ൅ ߚହܤ݄݁ܽݒ௜൅ ߚ଺ܫܰܦܪܤ௜௧ ൅ ߚ଻ߙ௝ ൅ ߳௜௝௧ (9)  
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(i.e. rest of the world) source markets; and EMU and non-EMU host markets, and re-run this 
test. Results are presented in Appendix 3, Appendix 4, Appendix 5, and Appendix 6. We do 
find evidence of Euro bias (see Balli et al., 2010) where EMU countries tend to invest more 
in fellow EMU countries.26 Nevertheless, the results in these appendices provide consistent 
evidence that FBIAS decreased during the Eurozone crisis (but not during the global financial 
crisis); and such decrease was severe for the host countries that were affected more by that 
debt crisis. 
[Insert Table VII KHUH«@ 
Overall, the results in Table VII provide strong evidence that foreign bias decreased 
significantly during Eurozone debt crisis and that the magnitude of reduction was greater in 
those countries that were most severely affected by the crisis.  
We examine further whether this change in foreign bond bias during Eurozone debt 
crisis was influenced more by economic fundamentals or by non-economic factors. We 
extract the first component of the six economic fundamentals using factor analysis and name 
it FactorFund.27 Similarly we extract first component of the non-economic factors and name 
it FactorFam. To assess whether the importance of variables change during crises, we follow 
the approach in Gelos and Wei (2005). We interact each of the factor components 
FactorFund and FactorFam with Eurozone debt crisis dummy (ECrisis) to create interaction 
terms CrFundW (FactorFund * ECrisis) and CrFamW (FactorFam * ECrisis) and run the 
regression using equation (10) as shown below:  
 
                                                          
26 We thank the two anonymous referees for this idea. 
27 CRISK enters factor analysis in absolute values rather than the residuals. 
 
ܨܾ݅ܽݏ௜௝௧ ൌ ߚଵܥݎܨݑ݊݀ ௝ܹ௧ ൅ ߚଶܥݎܨܽ݉ ௜ܹ௝௧ ൅ ߚଷܨܽܿݐ݋ݎܨݑ݊݀௝௧ ൅ ߚସܨܽܿݐ݋ݎܨܽ݉௜௝௧൅ ߚହܫܰܵܤ௜௧ ൅ ߚ଺ߙ௝ ൅ ௝߳௧ (10)  
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In Table VIII Model I, FactorFund enters the regression with positive sign that is 
significant at the 1%level. It is important to note the factor loadings28  which show that BDEV 
and PROP carry the highest positive values and EXCH and CRISK carry significant negative 
values. As such, positive value for FactorFund implies more foreign bias towards countries 
with lower CRISK, lower EXCH, higher PROP and higher BDEV which is consistent with our 
earlier findings. FactorFam is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. In the 
factor loadings for FactorFam,29 DIST and UNTAV have the two highest positive values 
while COMLA and BITRD have negative values. This suggests that the negative sign of 
FactorFam implies more foreign bias towards countries with common language, more trade, 
less distance, and from investors who have lower level of UNTAV. This is also consistent 
with our earlier findings. However, the key variable of interest in Model I is CrFamW which 
has the same negative sign as FactorFam implying that the importance of non-economic 
variables gained further importance during Eurozone crisis. No such inference can be made 
for economic fundamentals as CrFundW, despite bearing the same sign as FactorFund, is not 
significant.   
In Model II, we focus mainly on Eurozone member countries to assess possible 
changes in the importance of fundamentals and familiarity variables. We replace CrFundW 
and CrFamW by CrFundEu and CrFamEu respectively. CrFundEu is an interaction term 
involving FactorFund, ECrisis, and EZone and CrFamEu involves interacting FactorFam, 
ECrisis, and EZone. The variable of interest CrFamEu is negative implying enhancement of 
importance of non-economic variables during the crisis. Interestingly, the coefficient of 
CrFamEu (-1.06) remains similar to that of CrFundW in Model I. This is explained by the 
influence of France and Germany, without which the CrFamEu would be further negative.  
                                                          
28 Factor loadings (unrotated) for FactorFund are: YLD (-0.21), EXCH (-0.58), BDEV (+0.71), PROP (+0.79), 
CAPOP (+0.52), CRISK (-0.8).  
29 Factor loadings (unrotated) for FactorFam are: DIST (+0.41), COMLA (-0.30), BITRD (-0.39), UNTAV 
(+0.28), and MASC (+0.15). 
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In Model III, we focus on the GIIPS countries. Accordingly, we replace CrFundEu 
and CrFamEu by CrFund5 and CrFam5 respectively. CrFund5 is an interaction term of 
FactorFund, ECrisis, and GIIPS and CrFam5 involves interacting FactorFam, ECrisis, and 
GIIPS. CrFam5 is negative at the 1% level (similar to FactorFam) and its coefficient is 
markedly more negative to the comparable interaction terms in the first two models. This 
implies that the importance of non-economic factors get even more pronounced when it 
comes to investing in crisis-affected countries.30 
Overall, results in Table VIII suggest that though economic fundamentals and non-
economic factors are both important in bond investment during normal times, the importance 
of non-economic factors become much stronger and pronounced during debt crisis, and 
especially so when investing in crisis affected countries. A plausible explanation is that as 
debt crisis unfolds, bond investors would be more inclined to withdraw from those affected 
markets, and particularly from distant and unfamiliar markets, regardless of economic 
fundamentals.  
[Insert Table VIII here«@ 
 
4.7. Developed versus Emerging Markets  
So far, we have conducted our analyses in a global setting without distinguishing between 
emerging and developed markets. However, our summary statistics in Section 4.1 show that 
there are considerable differences between the macroeconomic fundamentals of developed 
and emerging markets. On the behavioural front, though the average MASC is similar for both 
sets of countries, the level of UNTAV is lower for developed markets. This motivates us to 
conduct further tests to unravel any different investment patterns that could be observed 
                                                          
30 We also interact each of the key variables separately (with crisis year dummy and country dummy) to create 
11 interaction terms on top of the explanatory variables in our regression analysis. VIF score for some of the 
interaction terms shoot up to more than 10 resulting in some of the variables of interest showing up as 
statistically non-significant due to severe multicollinearity. Despite this, DIST and UNTAV continue to exhibit 
increased impact during the crisis. Results are available from authors on request.  
30 
 
among developed and emerging countries.31 To achieve this, we re-run equation (4) 
separately for host emerging markets and host developed markets, and calculate the VARD 
measures and standardized beta for the variables of interest. The results shown in Appendix 1 
show qualitatively similar results (as in Table III) suggesting that the impact of variables of 
interest are pervasive across emerging as well as developed markets. We further extend this 
analysis to examine investments across various permutations of emerging and developed 
markets; specifically, we examine investments: i) from emerging markets only; ii) from 
developed markets only; iii) from emerging to developed markets; iv) from developed to 
developed markets; v) from emerging to emerging markets; and vi) from developed to 
emerging markets. For brevity, we show these results in Appendix 2 without VARD 
measures and standardized beta coefficients but again, the results are qualitatively similar.    
 
5. Conclusions 
In this study we investigate three important issues related to foreign bond investments. First, 
whether economic fundamentals and/or non-economic factors are associated with cross-
country biases, including how investor-specific behavioural features are related to foreign 
allocation in bonds. Second, using the 2007-09 global financial and 2009-11 European 
sovereign debt crisis as an experiment, we also investigate whether investors 
reallocate/rebalance their portfolio during these turbulent economic periods. Finally, we also 
examine whether the crisis periods interact with factors driving biases in international bond 
allocations.  
Using country level data from 54 countries over 12 years, we find that economic 
fundamentals and non-economic factors including familiarity and behavioural factors are 
both important drivers of foreign bias, but bond foreign bias is influenced more by non-
                                                          
31 We thank the anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
31 
 
economic factors than economic fundamentals. We find geographical distance between 
countries and the uncertainty avoidance attitudes of investors to be more influential drivers of 
foreign bias compared to economic fundamentals. These results are robust using various tests 
including addressing endogeneity and exclusion of the main financial centres.  
We find that the deadweight costs of investing in bonds of countries experiencing 
debt crisis increase, which in turn lower foreign bias (i.e. lower allocation with respect to 
benchmark) in such affected countries. Our analysis of Eurozone debt crisis further indicates 
that such under-weighting of crisis countries is predominantly driven by the non-economic 
factors during turbulent economic periods. However, when faced with financial/banking 
crisis (i.e. global financial crisis), we do not find evidence of change in the patterns of foreign 
bond bias. The findings of the study suggest that government policies aimed at increasing 
information on domestic markets to foreign investors should attract higher foreign 
investments, as implied by the impact of familiarity and behavioural factors, particularly 
during volatile economic periods. 
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Table I: Key Variables and Definitions 
Variable 
name 
Measure  Definition 
FBIAS Foreign Bias log (ratio of weight of allocation made by foreigners to host country's 
market weight in world bond market) 
YLD Real yield on bonds annual yield on 10-year government bonds minus inflation minus 
sovereign risk; annual yield sourced from International Financial 
Statistics (%) and Economic Intelligence Unit; consumer price 
LQIODWLRQ LV IURP :', VRYHUHLJQ ULVN PHDVXUH EDVHG RQ 0RRG\¶V
ratings is from Damodaran Online. Alternative figures on long-term 
bond yields are taken from JP Morgan EMBI Global series (for 
developing markets) and 10-year sovereign bonds from Datastream 
(for developed markets). 
EXCH Exchange rate volatility yearly volatility in indices for effective exchange rate; volatility for 
preceding 36 months from year-end is taken ; raw data is from BIS. 
BDEV Bond market development log ratio of private debt (both domestic and international) to GDP; 
data sourced from Global Financial Development Database available 
at: http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/global-financial-
development.  
PROP Protection of property rights sourced from table 2c of Economic Freedom of the World 2013 
dataset; is within the scale of 1 to 10 and higher measure indicates 
clearer definition and higher protection of property rights. 
CAPOP Capital openness (capital control) taken from table 4Dii of Economic Freedom Dataset 2013; within a 
scale of 0 to 10; higher measure indicates lower level of restrictions 
on investment and foreign ownership in that country. 
CRISK Country risk 0RRG\¶VFRXQWU\UDWLQJVKLJKHUVFRUHLQGLFDWHVKLJKHUULVN 
UNTAV Uncertainty avoidance; reflects the 
extent to which members of a 
society feel uncomfortable with 
uncertainty and ambiguity. 
+RIVWHGH¶VPHDVXUHRIXQFHUWDLQW\DYRidance (Hofstede 1980); 
DOWHUQDWLYHPHDVXUHLVIURP*/2%(VWXG\¶V(House et al 2004). 
MASC Masculinity; represents a preference 
in society for achievement, 
heroism, assertiveness and material 
rewards for success. 
 +RIVWHGH¶VPeasure of masculinity (Hofstede 1980). 
DIST Log of distance in Kilometres 
between capital cities 
http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/statelist.html. 
COMLA Common language dummy variable of 1 if a country pair share a language; data from 
Wei and Subraminian (2007) sourced from 
http://users.nber.org/~wei/data.html which is derived from CIA 
Factbook. 
BILTR Bilateral trade weight assigned by 
partner countries 
from IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS), it is the portion of 
total trade (imports and exports) conducted, from the perspective of 
source country, with a host country. 
INSB Control for foreign bond allocation 
of home country's investors 
(1- domestic bias) of home country (country i). 
ECrisis Dummy for Eurozone debt crisis Equal to 1 for years 2009-2011; otherwise 0. 
GIIPS Dummy for countries most severely 
affected by Eurozone debt crisis 
Equal to 1 for Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain; otherwise 
0. 
GCrisis Dummy for global financial crisis Equal to 1 for years 2007-2008; otherwise 0. 
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Table II 
Summary Statistics of Key Variables 
FBIAS is a measure of bond foreign bias at country level. Foreign bias reflects deviation of country j¶VVKDUHLQERQGKROGLQJVIRUHDFKsource country i (i j) (w i j) from the world bond market 
capitalization weight of country j (w* j). We calculate foreign bias by log (w i j / w* j). This table presents overall average of foreign bias measure taking yearly average of source FRXQWULHV¶ELDV
in country j for each given year. Remaining variables include i) Economic Fundamentals for host country j and ii) bilateral and investor-specific Familiarity Factors. Economic Fundamentals 
include annual yield on long-term government bonds (YLD), exchange rate volatility (EXCH), bond market development (BDEV), protection of property rights (PROP), capital openness 
(CAPOP), and country risk (CRISK). Familiarity Factors include distance (in kilometers) between countries (DIST), common language (COMLA) dummy, average bilateral trade weight assigned 
by partner countries (BILTR), uncertainty avoidance (UNTAV) of source country, and masculinity (MASC) of source country. All variables are sourced as reported in Table 1. Data is for years 
2001 to 2012. 
Panel A: All Countries 
Country FBIAS YLD (%) EXCH (%) BDEV   
(% GDP) 
PROP  
(0-10) 
CAPOP    
(0-10) 
CRISK  
(0-10) 
 DIST 
(km)  
COMLA 
(average) 
BILTR 
(%) 
UNTAV 
(1-100) 
MASC   
(1-100) 
Argentina -5.53 14.60 10.52 8.4 2.98 1.98 6.55   11,379 0.11 1.03 86 56 
Australia -3.82 2.48 8.19 95.1 8.18 2.57 0.05      13,277  0.37 2.19 51 61 
Austria -2.80 1.77 1.94 97.2 8.42 4.16 0.00 4,365  0.03 1.56 70 79 
Bahrain -7.27 n/a n/a 21.8 7.33 6.79 1.30 5,670  0.06 0.11 n/a n/a 
Belgium -3.91 1.41 2.37 104.2 7.60 5.86 0.48 4,352  0.17 3.46 94 54 
Brazil -5.02 4.46 12.48 21.8 5.40 3.78 3.17 10,075  0.03 2.37 76 49 
Bulgaria -5.44 -0.04 3.35 1.9 3.70 6.10 2.76 3,998  0.00 0.50 85 40 
Canada -4.41 2.30 5.93 54.4 8.23 7.39 0.05 8,176  0.41 1.75 48 52 
Chile -5.76 2.67 7.59 21.4 6.49 5.58 0.83 11,778  0.10 0.77 86 28 
Colombia -7.15 3.40 9.05 1.8 4.86 1.13 1.82 9,598  0.10 0.28 80 64 
Czech Republic -5.33 0.57 6.16 15.6 n/a n/a 0.90 3,816  0.00 1.21 74 57 
Denmark -4.45 1.66 2.43 188.7 8.53 7.92 0.00 4,425  0.33 1.24 23 16 
Egypt -7.60 0.26 n/a 1.2 5.00 5.16 2.76 5,053  0.41 0.54 80 45 
Estonia -7.45 3.52 2.63 2.2 7.18 6.60 0.96 4,059  0.00 0.38 60 30 
Finland -3.43 1.97 2.88 45.7 8.87 4.94 0.00 4,603  0.03 1.24 59 26 
France -2.55 2.11 2.51 102.0 8.06 6.44 0.02 4,893  0.10 6.53 86 43 
Germany -2.08 1.92 3.23 107.2 8.62 5.27 0.00 4,854  0.07 13.66 65 66 
Greece -4.14 2.65 4.34 48.1 5.86 4.89 2.54 4,616  0.00 0.62 100 57 
Hong Kong -6.24 0.86 4.48 39.5 8.21 7.87 0.59 8,458  0.36 2.06 29 57 
Hungary -4.58 1.40 7.49 11.5 5.79 5.05 1.44 3,962  0.00 1.14 82 88 
India -6.45 -3.86 5.63 3.3 6.12 0.00 2.64 6,686  0.36 3.13 40 56 
Indonesia -7.53 0.87 10.17 4.7 4.50 1.41 4.18 9,623  0.00 1.54 48 46 
Ireland -2.66 3.09 3.73 258.3 8.34 8.36 0.81 4,921  0.33 0.92 35 68 
Israel -8.68 -0.40 5.40 6.5 6.89 7.83 0.93 5,196  0.30 0.50 81 47 
Italy -3.81 1.70 2.55 72.7 5.81 7.63 0.73 4,767  0.00 6.07 75 70 
Japan -7.35 0.67 7.84 47.7 7.70 5.51 0.80 9,285  0.00 6.59 92 95 
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Kazakhstan -5.15 -2.74 n/a 9.9 4.97 1.83 1.54 6,519  0.00 0.37 n/a n/a 
Kuwait -8.13 n/a n/a n/a 6.95 4.51 0.59 5,298  0.31 0.53 80 40 
Lebanon -11.26 n/a n/a 2.1 5.38 1.54 5.52 5,191  n/a 0.13 50 65 
Lithuania -3.58 3.42 3.25 n/a 5.51 3.08 1.52 3,732  0.00 0.50 65 19 
Malaysia -6.07 0.16 3.43 67.4 7.02 0.71 1.13 8,777  0.00 2.49 36 50 
Mauritius -9.73 1.73 n/a n/a 6.54 6.12 1.39 8,967  0.34 0.05 n/a n/a 
Mexico -4.52 2.30 7.94 19.7 5.03 1.60 1.38 10,123  0.11 1.51 82 69 
Netherlands -1.89 1.76 3.12 196.7 8.45 9.15 0.00 4,894  0.03 5.08 53 14 
New Zealand -5.40 2.60 7.87 7.9 8.06 7.62 0.06 15,002  0.35 0.30 49 58 
Norway -3.74 2.00 5.31 29.8 8.18 5.37 0.00 4,654  0.00 1.11 50 8 
Pakistan -11.20 -6.73 n/a 0.4 4.03 0.77 5.98 6,523  0.34 0.32 70 50 
Philippines -6.42 0.91 5.28 8.5 4.46 0.77 3.25 9,227  0.32 0.67 44 64 
Poland -3.73 1.82 8.35 2.7 5.14 1.75 1.00 4,110  0.00 1.72 93 64 
Portugal -4.87 2.31 1.99 106.7 6.69 5.78 1.13 5,184  0.03 0.67 99 31 
Romania -5.69 0.19 5.71 0.8 4.49 6.68 2.87 4,136  0.00 0.83 90 42 
Russia -4.16 -2.69 6.32 6.3 3.27 4.64 1.46 4,815  0.00 5.72 95 36 
Singapore -5.85 0.24 2.93 36.1 8.72 6.45 0.04 8,843  0.38 3.47 8 48 
Slovenia -5.56 1.83 2.61 15.5 5.70 3.44 0.96 3,731  0.00 0.32 88 19 
South Africa -6.03 2.01 12.05 25.6 7.39 0.77 1.13 8,872  0.35 0.93 49 63 
South Korea -6.03 1.06 7.11 69.0 6.35 4.48 1.00 8,439  0.35 3.37 85 39 
Spain -3.82 1.60 2.67 123.0 6.57 4.18 0.35 5,310  0.10 3.46 86 42 
Sweden -3.28 2.18 4.94 105.9 8.58 3.64 0.05 4,708  0.03 2.28 29 5 
Switzerland -3.63 1.76 4.56 104.5 8.90 5.20 0.00 4,724  0.18 2.44 58 70 
Thailand -9.07 0.12 3.75 16.2 5.36 1.54 1.39 8,409  0.35 1.61 64 34 
Turkey -5.05 1.20 12.85 1.5 4.95 2.20 4.04 4,574  0.00 1.63 85 45 
Ukraine -5.02 1.92 n/a 3.5 2.93 0.52 5.07 4,202  0.00 0.83 n/a n/a 
United Kingdom -2.05 1.60 5.17 101.8 8.38 8.27 0.00 5,218  0.37 7.11 35 66 
United States -2.66 1.50 4.33 141.0 7.74 5.54 0.00 8,913  0.37 17.62 46 62 
Overall Average -5.07 1.54 5.52 62.8 6.74 4.70 1.32 6,686  0.16 2.9 64.5 50.3 
             Panel B: Developed versus Emerging Markets 
   
  
FBIAS YLD (%) EXCH (%) BDEV 
(% GDP) 
PROP (0-
10) 
CAPOP    
(0-10) 
CRISK  DIST 
(km)  
COMLA 
(average) 
BILTR 
(%) 
UNTAV 
(1-100) 
MASC   
(1-100) 
Developed -3.93 1.75 4.16 95.9 7.92 6.13 0.33 6,321  0.18 4.2 59.1 50.0 
 
            
Emerging -6.37 1.24 7.57 16.0 5.31 2.97 2.45 7,104  0.14 1.3 71.5 50.7 
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Table III 
Regression Analysis of Foreign Bias 
The dependent variable is foreign bias (FBIAS), the log ratio of the share of a host country (country j) in bond holdings of a source country (country i) to the world bond market weight of country j. Two sets of regressors 
are included: i) Economic Fundamentals for host country j and ii) bilateral and investor-specific Familiarity Factors. Economic Fundamentals include annual yield on long-term government bonds (YLD) net of inflation 
and sovereign risk, log (natural) of exchange rate volatility (EXCH), log of bond market development (BDEV), protection of property rights (PROP), capital openness (CAPOP), and country risk (CRISK). Familiarity 
Factors include log of kilometer distance between countries (DIST), common language (COMLA) dummy, average bilateral trade weight assigned by partner countries (BILTR), uncertainty avoidance (UNTAV) of source 
country, and masculinity (MASC) of source country. INSB equals one minus home bias of source country i and controls for the obvious impact of country i¶VGRPHVWLFELDV$OOYDULDEOHVDUHFRQVWUXFWHGRUVRXUFHGDV
reported in Table 1. All models report results with the standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity at panel level using White (1980) method. VARD shows relative importance of variables using variance 
decomposition analysis.  Data is for years 2001 to 2012. Statistical significance is reported against 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) significance levels. t-statistics are shown in parenthesis. 
 Expected  
Sign 
Model I 
 
Model II 
 
Model III 
 
Model IV 
 
VARD Standardized 
Coefficients 
YLD + 0.05***  0.05*** 0.06** 0.05% 0.038 
  (3.01)  (3.11) (2.31)   
        
EXCH - -0.81***  -0.81*** -0.51*** 2.70% -0.056 
  (-3.99)  (-9.78) (-4.68)   
        
BDEV + 0.31***  0.37*** 0.53*** 7.30% 0.109 
  (2.84)  (7.79) (3.01)   
        
PROP + 0.15**  0.25*** 0.09** 1.20% 0.023 
  (2.54)  (3.14) (2.06)   
        
CAPOP + 0.06**  0.11** 0.03** 0.03% 0.006 
  (2.51)  (2.54) (2.56)   
        
CRISK - -0.19***  -0.23*** -0.17*** 0.04% -0.029 
  (-2.98)  (-2.99) (-3.09)   
        
DIST -  -2.65*** -2.63*** -2.33*** 55.4% -0.369 
   (-24.35) (-23.33) (-20.79)   
        
COMLA  +  0.76*** 0.66** 0.82*** 1.50% 0.037 
   (2.82) (2.49) (3.88)   
        
BILTR +  0.05*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.06% 0.001 
   (5.37) (5.54) (3.39)   
        
UNTAV -  -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.05*** 28.20% -0.266 
   (-17.00) (-16.40) (-12.86)   
        
MASC +  0.04*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 2.30% 0.122 
   (8.92) (8.08) (3.46)   
        
INSB +    0.80***   
     (15.98)   
        
Year Fixed     YES   
Host Country Fixed YES YES YES YES   
        
Constant  -8.06*** -1.42** -7.08*** -0.88   
  (-8.28) (-2.26) (-7.38) (-0.85)   
Adjusted R 2 
Observations 
0.08 0.28 0.29 0.34   
14102 14102 14102 14102   
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Table IV 
Examining Reverse Causality 
The dependent variable is foreign bias (FBIAS), the log ratio of the share of a host country (country j) in bond holdings of a source country (country i) to the world bond market weight of country j. Two sets of 
regressors are included: i) Economic Fundamentals for host country j and ii) bilateral and investor-specific Familiarity Factors. Economic Fundamentals include annual yield on long-term government bonds (YLD) net 
of inflation and sovereign risk, log (natural) of exchange rate volatility (EXCH), log of bond market development (BDEV), protection of property rights (PROP), capital openness (CAPOP), and country risk (CRISK). 
Familiarity Factors include log of kilometer distance between countries (DIST), common language (COMLA) dummy, average bilateral trade weight assigned by partner countries (BILTR), uncertainty avoidance 
(UNTAV) of source country, and masculinity (MASC) of source country. INSB equals one minus home bias of source country i and controls for the obvious impact of country i¶VGRPHVWLFELDV$OOYDULDEOHVDUH
constructed or sourced as reported in Table 1. All models report results with the standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity at panel level using White (1980) method. Data is for years 2001 to 2012. Statistical 
significance is reported against 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) significance levels. t-statistics are shown in parenthesis. 
 Expected Sign Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
YLD + 0.05**  0.05** 0.06*** 
  (2.30)  (2.41) (2.87) 
      
EXCH - -0.68***  -0.75*** -0.55*** 
  (-3.36)  (-4.04) (-3.98) 
      
BDEV (1-yr lag) + 0.27**  0.39** 0.45*** 
  (2.52)  (2.15) (3.13) 
      
PROP (1-yr lag) + 0.18***  0.17*** 0.09** 
  (3.07)  (3.44) (2.41) 
      
CAPOP (1-yr lag) + 0.05***  0.07** 0.04* 
  (2.91)  (2.19) (1.77) 
      
CRISK (1-yr lag) - -0.17**  -0.24*** -0.20*** 
  (-2.23)  (-3.23) (-2.91) 
      
DIST -  -2.51*** -2.51*** -1.92*** 
   (-22.25) (-21.26) (-19.31) 
      
COMLA  +  0.67** 0.55** 0.72*** 
   (2.52) (2.08) (3.25) 
      
BILTR (1-yr lag) +  0.08*** 0.08** 0.02*** 
   (5.07) (2.26) (3.37) 
      
UNTAV -  -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.05*** 
   (-16.89) (-16.12) (-13.24) 
      
MASC +  0.04*** 0.04*** 0.02*** 
   (9.37) (8.45) (3.97) 
      
INSB +    0.77*** 
     (14.20) 
      
Year Fixed     YES 
Host Country Fixed YES YES YES YES 
      
Constant  -7.10*** -1.27** -6.32*** -0.82 
  (-6.95) (-2.01) (-6.32) (-0.88) 
Adjusted R 2 
Observations 
0.08 0.29 0.30 0.35 
11715 11715 11715 11715 
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Table V 
Regression Analysis of Foreign Bias Excluding Financial Centres 
The dependent variable is foreign bias (FBIAS), the log ratio of the share of a host country (country j) in bond holdings of a source country (country i) to the world bond market weight of country j. Two sets of 
regressors are included: i) Economic Fundamentals for host country j and ii) bilateral and investor-specific Familiarity Factors. Economic Fundamentals include annual yield on long-term government bonds (YLD) net 
of inflation and sovereign risk, log (natural) of exchange rate volatility (EXCH), log of bond market development (BDEV), protection of property rights (PROP), capital openness (CAPOP), and country risk (CRISK). 
Familiarity Factors include log of kilometer distance between countries (DIST), common language (COMLA) dummy, average bilateral trade weight assigned by partner countries (BILTR), uncertainty avoidance 
(UNTAV) of source country, and masculinity (MASC) of source country. INSB equals one minus home bias of source country i and controls for the obvious impact of country i¶VGRPHVWLFELDV$OOYDULDEOHVDUH
constructed or sourced as reported in Table 1. All models report results with the standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity at panel level using White (1980) method. Data is for years 2001 to 2012. Statistical 
significance is reported against 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) significance levels. t-statistics are shown in parenthesis.  
 Expected Sign Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
YLD + 0.05***  0.07*** 0.07*** 
  (2.87)  (2.89) (3.21) 
      
EXCH - -0.66***  -0.64*** -0.58*** 
  (-3.63)  (-9.50) (-2.79) 
      
BDEV + 0.31***  0.45*** 0.63*** 
  (3.05)  (3.21) (3.36) 
      
PROP + 0.17*  0.27*** 0.07** 
  (1.83)  (2.86) (2.06) 
      
CAPOP + 0.10**  0.13** 0.05** 
  (2.69)  (2.43) (2.31) 
      
CRISK - -0.24***  -0.25*** -0.18** 
  (-2.78)  (-2.71) (-2.58) 
      
DIST -  -3.00*** -3.00*** -2.23*** 
   (-24.53) (-23.48) (-19.59) 
      
COMLA  +  0.73** 0.61** 0.95*** 
   (2.31) (2.15) (3.56) 
      
BILTR +  0.07*** 0.08*** 0.03*** 
   (4.99) (3.14) (2.94) 
      
UNTAV -  -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.04*** 
   (-10.21) (-9.65) (-7.32) 
      
MASC +  0.03** 0.02** 0.02** 
   (2.53) (2.36) (2.26) 
      
INSB +    0.89*** 
     (6.33) 
      
Year Fixed     YES 
Host Country Fixed YES YES YES YES 
      
Constant  -9.09*** -1.09 -7.89*** -1.50 
  (-8.05) (-1.40) (-6.73) (-1.22) 
Adjusted R 2 
Observations 
0.10 0.28 0.29 0.33 
11539 11539 11539 11539 
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Table VI 
Examining Foreign Bias During Crises And Normal Times  
Foreign bias (FBIAS) is the log ratio of the share of a host country (country j) in bond holdings of a source country (country i) to the world bond market weight of country j. This table shows the 
comparative average foreign bias of country j during crisis and non-crisis periods using a t-test. Crisis periods include global financial crisis (2007-2008) and Eurozone sovereign debt crisis 
(2009-2011). 
  
Panel A: Foreign Bias ± Normal Period versus Global Financial Crisis (2007-08) and Eurozone Debt Crisis (2009-11) 
 2001-06,  2012 2007-2011 Difference t-statistics p-value 
FBIAS -4.867 -5.289 0.422 4.610 0.000 
No. of Observations 20123     
 
Panel B: Foreign Bias ± Normal Period versus Global Financial Crisis (2007-08) 
 2001-06,  2012 2007-08 Difference t- statistics p-value 
FBIAS -4.867 -4.716 -0.151 -1.211 0.226 
No. of Observations 13845     
 
Panel C: Foreign Bias ± Normal Period versus Eurozone Debt Crisis (2009-11) 
 2001-06,  2012 2009-11 Difference t- statistics p-value 
FBIAS -4.867 -5.599 0.732 6.985 0.000 
No. of Observations 16735     
 
Panel D: Foreign Bias ± Normal Period versus Eurozone Debt Crisis (2009-11) (GIIPS countries only) 
 2001-06,  2012 2009-11 Difference t- statistics p-value 
FBIAS -3.616 -4.428 0.813 2.933 0.003 
No. of Observations 2101     
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Table VII 
Bond Foreign Bias During Eurozone Debt Crisis and Global Financial Crisis 
The dependent variable is foreign bias (FBIAS), the log ratio of the share of a host country (country j) in bond holdings of a source country (country i) to the world bond market weight of country j. GIIPSCr is an 
interaction term of ECrisis and GIIPS. ECrisis is a dummy variable of 1 for Eurozone crisis years 2009 - 2011 and GIIPS is a dummy variable of 1 for five Eurozone crisis countries namely Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal 
and Spain (GIIPS), 0 otherwise. EuZCr is an interaction term of ECrisis and EZone. EZone is a dummy variable of 1 for all countries within the European Monetary Union, 0 otherwise. GCrisis is a dummy variable of 1 
for Global Financial crisis years 2007 ± 2008; 0 otherwise. Other regressors include: i) Economic Fundamentals for host country j and ii) bilateral and investor-specific Familiarity Factors. Economic Fundamentals 
include annual yield on long-term government bonds (YLD) net of inflation and sovereign risk, log (natural) of exchange rate volatility (EXCH), log of bond market development (BDEV), protection of property rights 
(PROP), capital openness (CAPOP), and country risk (CRISK). Familiarity Factors include log of kilometer distance between countries (DIST), common language (COMLA) dummy, average bilateral trade weight 
assigned by partner countries (BILTR), uncertainty avoidance (UNTAV) of source country, and masculinity (MASC) of source country. INSB equals one minus home bias of source country i and controls for the obvious 
impact of country i¶VGRPHVWLFELDV$OOYDULDEOHVDUHFRQstructed or sourced as reported in Table 1. All models report results with the standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity at panel level using White (1980) 
method. Data is for years 2001 to 2012. Statistical significance is reported against 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) significance levels. t-statistics are shown in parenthesis.   
 Model I 
All Countries 
Model II 
Interaction with EMU 
Model III  
Interaction with EMU except Germany and 
France 
Model IV 
Interaction with GIIPS 
ECrisis -0.47*** -0.55*** -0.47*** -0.46*** 
 (-3.97) (-3.95) (-3.61) (-3.76) 
GCrisis 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 
 (1.45) (1.45) (1.45) (1.45) 
EuZCr  -0.14 -0.12*  
  (-0.62) (-1.86)  
EZone  0.62*** 0.38  
  (2.74) (1.60)  
GIIPSCr    -0.24** 
    (-2.39) 
GIIPS    0.17 
    (0.61) 
YLD 0.03** 0.02* 0.02* 0.03*** 
 (2.52) (1.88) (1.84) (3.11) 
EXCH -1.31*** -1.26*** -1.26*** -1.31*** 
 (-5.87) (-5.75) (-5.69) (-5.95) 
BDEV 0.54*** 0.58*** 0.58*** 0.61*** 
 (4.25) (3.77) (3.76) (4.12) 
PROP 0.18** 0.19** 0.19** 0.06* 
 (2.39) (2.50) (2.50) (1.94) 
CAPOP 0.08** 0.08** 0.08** 0.11** 
 (2.37) (2.44) (2.42) (2.37) 
CRISK -0.28*** -0.29*** -0.29*** -0.28*** 
 (-3.58) (-3.64) (-3.66) (-3.60) 
DIST -2.32*** -2.32*** -2.32*** -2.32*** 
 (-20.74) (-20.74) (-20.45 (-20.74) 
COMLA  1.01*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.01*** 
 (3.89) (3.89) (3.77) (3.89) 
BILTR 0.02** 0.03** 0.03** 0.02** 
 (2.30) (2.31) (2.31) (2.32) 
UNTAV -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** 
 (-12.83) (-12.83) (-12.22) (-12.83) 
MASC 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 (3.45) (3.45) (3.46) (3.45) 
INSB 0.79*** 0.79*** 0.79*** 0.79*** 
 (15.89) (15.89) (15.25) (15.89) 
Host Country Fixed YES YES YES YES 
Constant -1.75* -1.60* -1.76* -1.79* 
 (-1.80) (-1.65) (-1.82) (-1.85) 
Adjusted R 2 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 
Observations 14102 14102 14102 14102 
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Table VIII 
Importance of Economic and Non-Economic Factors During Eurozone Debt Crisis  
The dependent variable is foreign bias (FBIAS), the log ratio of the share of a host country (country j) in bond holdings of a source country (country i) to the world bond market weight of country j. Two sets of regressors 
are included: i) Economic Fundamentals for host country j and ii) bilateral and investor-specific Familiarity Factors. Economic Fundamentals include annual yield on long-term government bonds (YLD) net of inflation 
and sovereign risk, log (natural) of exchange rate volatility (EXCH), log of bond market development (BDEV), protection of property rights (PROP), capital openness (CAPOP); country risk (CRISK) and are represented 
by FactorFund using factor analysis. Familiarity Factors include log of distance (in kilometers) between countries (DIST), common language (COMLA), average bilateral trade weight assigned by partner countries 
(BILTR), uncertainty avoidance (UNTAV) of source country, and masculinity (MASC) of source country; and are represented by FactorFam using factor analysis. INSB equals one minus domestic bias for source country i 
and controls for the obvious impact of country i¶VGRPHVWLFDOORFDWLRQDVDVKDUHRI WRWDO LQYHVWPHQWCrFundW (CrFamW ) is an interaction term between FactorFund (FactorFam) and ECrisis. ECrisis is a dummy 
variable of 1 for years 2009-2011; otherwise 0. CrFundEu (CrFamEu) is an interaction term between FactorFund (FactorFam) and a dummy variable of 1 for all Eurozone countries during years 2009-2011, otherwise 0. 
CrFund5 (CrFam5) is an interaction term between FactorFund (FactorFam) and a dummy variable of 1 for five countries Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain (GIIPS) during years 2009-2011, otherwise 0. All 
models report results with the standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity at panel level using White (1980) method. Data is for years 2001 to 2012. Statistical significance is reported against 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% 
(***) significance levels. t-statistics are shown in parenthesis. 
 Model I 
Interaction with All 
Model II 
Interaction with Eurozone 
Model III 
Interaction with GIIPS 
FactorFund 0.83*** 0.79*** 0.76*** 
 (4.25) (4.07) (4.01) 
    
FactorFam -2.96*** -3.17*** -3.20*** 
 (-11.87) (-12.42) (-12.96) 
    
CrFundW 0.13   
 (1.19)   
    
CrFamW -1.06***   
 (-5.26)   
    
CrFundEu  -0.27  
  (-1.11)  
    
CrFamEu  -1.06**  
  (-2.56)  
    
CrFund5   -0.03 
   (-0.06) 
    
CrFam5   -2.67*** 
   (-2.83) 
    
INSB 1.04*** 1.04*** 1.05*** 
 (21.01) (20.97) (21.02) 
    
Host Country Fixed YES YES YES 
    
Constant 2.06*** 1.81** 1.76*** 
 (2.78) (2.47) (2.43) 
Adjusted R 2 0.28 0.28 0.28 
Observations 14102 14102 14102 
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Appendix 1 
Regression Analysis of Foreign Bias ± FBIAS into Emerging and Developed Markets 
This table exhibits separate regression for foreign bias (FBIAS) into Emerging Markets (Column I) and Developed Markets (Column II). The dependent variable is FBIAS, the log ratio of the share of a host country 
(country j) in bond holdings of a source country (country i) to the world bond market weight of country j. Two sets of regressors are included: i) Economic Fundamentals for host country j and ii) bilateral and investor-
specific Familiarity Factors. Economic Fundamentals include annual yield on long-term government bonds (YLD) net of inflation and sovereign risk, log (natural) of exchange rate volatility (EXCH), log of bond 
market development (BDEV), protection of property rights (PROP), capital openness (CAPOP), and country risk (CRISK). Familiarity Factors include log of kilometer distance between countries (DIST), common 
language (COMLA) dummy, average bilateral trade weight assigned by partner countries (BILTR), uncertainty avoidance (UNTAV) of source country, and masculinity (MASC) of source country. INSB equals one 
minus home bias of source country i and controls for the obvious impact of country i¶VGRPHVWLFELDV$OOYDULDEOHVDUHFRQVWUXFWHGRUVRXUFHGDVUHSRUWHGLQ7DEOH$OOPRGHOVUHSRUWUHVXOWVZLWKWKHVWDQGDUd errors 
corrected for heteroscedasticity at panel level using White (1980) method. VARD shows relative importance of variables using variance decomposition analysis.  Data is for years 2001 to 2012. Statistical significance 
is reported against 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) significance levels. t-statistics are shown in parenthesis 
                      I 
Into Emerging Markets 
VARD 
Emerging Markets 
Standardized Coefficients 
Emerging Markets  
II 
Into Developed Markets 
VARD 
Developed Markets 
Standardized Coefficients 
Developed Markets  
YLD 0.04** 0.12% 0.04 0.07** 5.73% 0.02 
 (2.03)   (2.35)   
       
EXCH -2.75*** 0.75% -0.21 -1.42*** 3.73% -0.12 
 (-7.75)   (-5.67)   
       
BDEV 0.36** 3.04% 0.07 0.33** 13.85% 0.05 
 (2.54)   (2.59)   
       
PROP 0.05* 0.18% 0.01 0.33*** 7.22% 0.06 
 (1.93)   (3.28)   
       
CAPOP 0.09* 0.2% 0.03 0.13*** 2.14% 0.05 
 (1.92)   (2.68)   
       
CRISK -0.10 0.24% -0.02 -0.42*** 8.39% -0.05 
 (-1.09)   (-3.67)   
       
DIST -3.32*** 59.44% -0.44 -2.04*** 37.63% -0.38 
 (-14.61)   (-16.40)   
       
COMLA  2.08*** 1.75% 0.11 0.60** 0.78% 0.04 
 (4.13)   (2.15)   
       
BILTR 0.06* -1.93% 0.03 0.04*** 0.21% 0.06 
 (1.81)   (2.67)   
       
UNTAV -0.06*** 30.77% -0.21 -0.04*** 17.87% -0.20 
 (-8.01)   (-9.77)   
       
MASC 0.02*** 4.71% 0.07 0.02** 0.45% 0.03 
 (2.65)   (2.67)   
       
INSB 1.29*** 1.5%% 0.34 0.61*** 1.3% 0.20 
 (14.34)   (10.70)   
Year Fixed YES   YES   
Host Country Fixed YES   YES   
Constant -4.84***   -3.45**   
 (-3.38)   (-2.17)   
Adjusted R 2 0.39   0.31   
Observations 4699   9403   
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Appendix 2 
Regression Analysis of Foreign Bias ± Combinations of Emerging and Developed Markets 
This table exhibits results for separate regressions for foreign bias (FBIAS) originating from Emerging markets (EM) and Developed markets (DM). The dependent variable is FBIAS, the log ratio of the share of a host 
country (country j) in bond holdings of a source country (country i) to the world bond market weight of country j. Two sets of regressors are included: i) Economic Fundamentals for host country j and ii) bilateral and 
investor-specific Familiarity Factors. Economic Fundamentals include annual yield on long-term government bonds (YLD) net of inflation and sovereign risk, log (natural) of exchange rate volatility (EXCH), log of 
bond market development (BDEV), protection of property rights (PROP), capital openness (CAPOP), and country risk (CRISK). Familiarity Factors include log of kilometer distance between countries (DIST), 
common language (COMLA) dummy, average bilateral trade weight assigned by partner countries (BILTR), uncertainty avoidance (UNTAV) of source country, and masculinity (MASC) of source country. INSB equals 
one minus home bias of source country i and controls for the obvious impact of country i¶VGRPHVWLFELDV$OOYDULDEOHVDUHFRQVWUXFWHGRUVRXUFHGDVUHSRUWHGLQ7DEOH$OOPRGHOVUHSRUWUHVXOWVZLWKWKHVWDQGDUd 
errors corrected for heteroscedasticity at panel level using White (1980) method. Data is for years 2001 to 2012. Statistical significance is reported against 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) significance levels. t-statistics 
are shown in parenthesis. 
 EM to All countries DM to All countries EM to DM DM to DM EM to EM DM to EM 
YLD 0.03** 0.02** 0.08** 0.01 0.07** 0.02** 
 (2.56) (2.42) (2.18) (1.46) (2.37) (2.25) 
       
EXCH -2.56*** -0.95*** -1.93*** -0.79*** -3.67*** -1.85*** 
 (-5.42) (-6.35) (-3.45) (-5.02) (-4.26) (-6.64) 
       
BDEV 0.20* 0.13* 0.62** 0.02* 0.58* 0.42** 
 (1.92) (1.98) (2.28) (1.95) (1.94) (2.06) 
       
PROP 0.37** 0.17*** 0.53** 0.18*** 0.04* 0.11* 
 (1.99) (2.86) (2.28) (3.36) (1.82) (1.96) 
       
CAPOP 0.13* 0.07*** 0.09* 0.05** 0.20* 0.05** 
 (1.71) (2.64) (1.81) (2.01) (1.88) (2.73) 
       
CRISK -0.27 -0.12** -0.28 -0.25*** -0.01 0.12 
 (-1.52) (-2.53) (-1.08) (-4.47) (-0.04) (1.27) 
       
DIST -2.92*** -1.50*** -2.74*** -1.05*** -2.83*** -2.96*** 
 (-14.80) (-15.04) (-12.17) (-11.69) (-5.74) (-12.82) 
       
COMLA  2.52*** 0.28* 1.83*** 0.09 3.91*** 0.98* 
 (5.45) (1.81) (3.51) (0.45) (4.02) (1.90) 
       
BILTR 0.01* 0.03* 0.03* 0.04* 0.12** 0.19** 
 (1.70) (1.81) (1.82) (1.75) (2.31) (2.23) 
       
UNTAV -0.06*** -0.03*** -0.05*** -0.02*** -0.06*** -0.05*** 
 (-6.57) (-8.03) (-5.57) (-5.38) (-3.07) (-6.61) 
       
MASC 0.05*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.02*** 0.07*** 0.04*** 
 (2.88) (7.03) (3.13) (3.74) (3.42) (5.93) 
       
INSB 0.02 0.19*** 0.15 0.02 0.36* 0.83*** 
 (0.18) (3.44) (1.20) (0.02) (1.65) (6.80) 
Year Fixed YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Host Country Fixed YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant -7.71*** -4.33*** -9.61*** -3.82*** -9.50*** -4.65*** 
 (-3.58) (-5.20) (-2.59) (-3.84) (-2.62) (-3.40) 
Adjusted R 2 0.31 0.33 0.29 0.36 0.30 0.35 
Observations 5291 8811 3682 5721 1609 3090 
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Appendix 3 
Bond Foreign Bias During Eurozone Debt Crisis and Global Financial Crisis ± from non-EMU source countries 
This table shows regression results of foreign bias (FBIAS) from non-EMU source countries to all host countries. The dependent variable is FBIAS, the log ratio of the share of a host country (country j) in bond 
holdings of a source country (country i) to the world bond market weight of country j. GIIPSCr is an interaction term of ECrisis and GIIPS. ECrisis is a dummy variable of 1 for Eurozone crisis years 2009 - 2011 and 
GIIPS is a dummy variable of 1 for five Eurozone crisis countries namely Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain (GIIPS), 0 otherwise. EuZCr is an interaction term of ECrisis and EZone. EZone is a dummy 
variable of 1 for all countries within the European Monetary Union, 0 otherwise. GCrisis is a dummy variable of 1 for Global Financial crisis years 2007 ± 2008; 0 otherwise. Other regressors include: i) Economic 
Fundamentals for host country j and ii) bilateral and investor-specific Familiarity Factors. Economic Fundamentals include annual yield on long-term government bonds (YLD) net of inflation and sovereign risk, log 
(natural) of exchange rate volatility (EXCH), log of bond market development (BDEV), protection of property rights (PROP), capital openness (CAPOP), and country risk (CRISK). Familiarity Factors include log of 
kilometer distance between countries (DIST), common language (COMLA) dummy, average bilateral trade weight assigned by partner countries (BILTR), uncertainty avoidance (UNTAV) of source country, and 
masculinity (MASC) of source country. INSB equals one minus home bias of source country i and controls for the obvious impact of country i¶VGRPHVWLFELDV$OOYDULDEOHVDUHFRQVWUXFWHGRUVRXUFHGDVUHSRUWHGLQ
Table 1. All models report results with the standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity at panel level using White (1980) method. Data is for years 2001 to 2012. Statistical significance is reported against 10% (*), 
5% (**) and 1% (***) significance levels. t-statistics are shown in parenthesis. 
 Model I 
All Countries 
Model II 
Interaction with EMU 
Model III 
Interaction with GIIPS 
ECrisis -0.75*** -0.64*** -0.64*** 
 (-4.71) (-3.33) (-3.84) 
    
GCrisis 0.28 0.27* 0.30 
 (1.59) (1.67) (1.625) 
    
EuZCr  -0.53*  
  (-1.82)  
    
EZone  0.76***  
  (3.52)  
    
GIIPSCr   -0.72* 
   (-1.80) 
    
GIIPS   -0.44* 
   (-1.70) 
    
YLD 0.05*** 0.04** 0.05*** 
 (2.83) (2.34) (2.92) 
    
EXCH -0.27* -0.18* -0.38** 
 (-1.73) (-1.79) (-2.34) 
    
BDEV 0.63*** 0.59*** 0.71*** 
 (8.43) (7.71) (8.96) 
    
PROP 0.12** 0.14** 0.11 
 (2.11) (2.47) (2.53) 
    
CAPOP 0.04* 0.03* 0.05* 
 (1.79) (1.84) (1.83) 
    
CRISK -0.22*** -0.23*** -0.19** 
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 (-2.83) (-2.94) (-2.48) 
    
DIST -1.89*** -1.86*** -1.90*** 
 (-25.94) (-25.61) (-26.03) 
    
COMLA  1.36*** 1.49*** 1.36*** 
 (8.58) (9.16) (8.55) 
    
BILTR 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 
 (3.56) (3.79) (3.13) 
    
UNTAV -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.07*** 
 (-25.84) (-25.83) (-25.86) 
    
MASC 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 (7.19) (7.10) (7.18) 
    
INSB 0.59*** 0.59*** 0.59*** 
 (15.98) (16.07) (16.00) 
    
Constant -4.15*** -3.46*** -4.24*** 
 (-7.59) (-5.56) (-7.76) 
Adjusted R 2 0.33 0.33 0.33 
Observations 9749 9749 9749 
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Appendix 4 
Bond Foreign Bias During Eurozone Debt Crisis and Global Financial Crisis ± from EMU source countries 
This table shows regression results of foreign bias (FBIAS) from EMU source countries to all host countries. The dependent variable is FBIAS, the log ratio of the share of a host country (country j) in bond holdings of 
a source country (country i) to the world bond market weight of country j. GIIPSCr is an interaction term of ECrisis and GIIPS. ECrisis is a dummy variable of 1 for Eurozone crisis years 2009 - 2011 and GIIPS is a 
dummy variable of 1 for five Eurozone crisis countries namely Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain (GIIPS), 0 otherwise. EuZCr is an interaction term of ECrisis and EZone. EZone is a dummy variable of 1 for 
all countries within the European Monetary Union, 0 otherwise. GCrisis is a dummy variable of 1 for Global Financial crisis years 2007 ± 2008; 0 otherwise. Other regressors include: i) Economic Fundamentals for 
host country j and ii) bilateral and investor-specific Familiarity Factors. Economic Fundamentals include annual yield on long-term government bonds (YLD) net of inflation and sovereign risk, log (natural) of 
exchange rate volatility (EXCH), log of bond market development (BDEV), protection of property rights (PROP), capital openness (CAPOP), and country risk (CRISK). Familiarity Factors include log of kilometer 
distance between countries (DIST), common language (COMLA) dummy, average bilateral trade weight assigned by partner countries (BILTR), uncertainty avoidance (UNTAV) of source country, and masculinity 
(MASC) of source country. INSB equals one minus home bias of source country i and controls for the obvious impact of country i¶VGRPHVWLFELDV$OOYDULDEOHVDUHFRQVWUXFWHGRUVRXUFHGDVUHSRUWHGLQ7DEOHAll 
models report results with the standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity at panel level using White (1980) method. Data is for years 2001 to 2012. Statistical significance is reported against 10% (*), 5% (**) and 
1% (***) significance levels. t-statistics are shown in parenthesis. 
 Model I 
All Countries 
Model II 
Interaction with EMU 
Model III 
Interaction with GIIPS 
ECrisis -0.73*** -1.11*** -0.75*** 
 (-4.15) (-4.77) (-3.90) 
    
GCrisis 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 
 (0.10) (-0.06) (-0.19) 
    
EuZCr  0.45*  
  (1.75)  
    
EZone  1.90***  
  (9.85)  
    
GIIPSCr   -0.13* 
   (-1.71) 
    
GIIPS   1.65*** 
   (8.99) 
    
YLD1 0.04** 0.03* 0.04* 
 (2.01) (1.88) (1.86) 
    
EXCH -0.60*** -0.41** -0.31** 
 (-3.49) (-2.40) (-2.22) 
    
BDEV 0.57*** 0.47*** 0.40*** 
 (6.81) (5.54) (4.53) 
    
PROP 0.10* 0.08* 0.07* 
 (1.78) (1.91) (1.74) 
    
CAPOP 0.02* 0.01* 0.03* 
 (1.87) (1.71) (1.88) 
    
CRISK -0.11* -0.15** -0.12* 
 (-1.77) (-2.03) (-1.91) 
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DIST -1.69*** -1.47*** -1.61*** 
 (-21.63) (-19.90) (-21.07) 
    
COMLA  0.98*** 0.55*** 0.71*** 
 (4.82) (2.88) (3.68) 
    
BILTR 0.00 0.03*** 0.01 
 (0.48) (3.33) (0.68) 
    
UNTAV -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** 
 (-14.46) (-14.67) (-14.48) 
    
MASC 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 (5.81) (5.85) (5.86) 
    
INSB 0.31*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 
 (5.86) (6.10) (6.05) 
    
Host Country Fixed YES YES YES 
Constant -1.89*** 0.66 -1.79*** 
 (-3.28) (0.98) (-3.08) 
Adjusted R 2 0.44 0.44 0.44 
Observations 4353 4353 4353 
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Appendix 5 
Bond Foreign Bias During Eurozone Debt Crisis and Global Financial Crisis ± All countries to non-EMU 
This table shows regression results of foreign bias (FBIAS) from all source countries to non-EMU host countries. The dependent variable is FBIAS, the log ratio of the share of a host country (country j) in bond 
holdings of a source country (country i) to the world bond market weight of country j. ECrisis is a dummy variable of 1 for Eurozone crisis years 2009 ± 2011.  GCrisis is a dummy variable of 1 for Global Financial 
crisis years 2007 ± 2008; 0 otherwise. Other regressors include: i) Economic Fundamentals for host country j and ii) bilateral and investor-specific Familiarity Factors. Economic Fundamentals include annual yield on 
long-term government bonds (YLD) net of inflation and sovereign risk, log (natural) of exchange rate volatility (EXCH), log of bond market development (BDEV), protection of property rights (PROP), capital 
openness (CAPOP), and country risk (CRISK). Familiarity Factors include log of kilometer distance between countries (DIST), common language (COMLA) dummy, average bilateral trade weight assigned by partner 
countries (BILTR), uncertainty avoidance (UNTAV) of source country, and masculinity (MASC) of source country. INSB equals one minus home bias of source country i and controls for the obvious impact of country 
i¶VGRPHVWLF bias. All variables are constructed or sourced as reported in Table 1. All models report results with the standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity at panel level using White (1980) method. Data is for 
years 2001 to 2012. Statistical significance is reported against 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) significance levels. t-statistics are shown in parenthesis. 
 Model I 
Non-EMU host countries 
ECrisis -0.81*** 
 (-5.09) 
  
GCrisis 0.14 
 (0.88) 
  
YLD 0.04** 
 (2.57) 
  
EXCH -0.42** 
 (-2.11) 
  
BDEV 0.62*** 
 (9.02) 
  
PROP 0.06** 
 (2.09) 
  
CAPOP 0.02* 
 (1.87) 
  
CRISK -0.11** 
 (-2.33) 
  
DIST -1.98*** 
 (-29.60) 
  
COMLA  1.00*** 
 (6.06) 
  
BILTR 0.02** 
 (2.36) 
  
UNTAV -0.06*** 
 (-21.06) 
  
MASC 0.02*** 
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 (6.32) 
  
INSB 0.96*** 
 (24.44) 
  
Host Country Fixed YES 
Constant -0.61 
 (-1.07) 
Adjusted R 2 0.33 
Observations 9521 
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Appendix 6 
Bond Foreign Bias During Eurozone Debt Crisis and Global Financial Crisis ± All countries to EMU 
This table shows regression results of foreign bias (FBIAS) from all source countries to EMU host countries. The dependent variable is FBIAS, the log ratio of the share of a host country (country j) in bond holdings of 
a source country (country i) to the world bond market weight of country j. GIIPSCr is an interaction term of ECrisis and GIIPS. ECrisis is a dummy variable of 1 for Eurozone crisis years 2009 - 2011 and GIIPS is a 
dummy variable of 1 for five Eurozone crisis countries namely Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain (GIIPS), 0 otherwise. GCrisis is a dummy variable of 1 for Global Financial crisis years 2007 ± 2008; 0 
otherwise. Other regressors include: i) Economic Fundamentals for host country j and ii) bilateral and investor-specific Familiarity Factors. Economic Fundamentals include annual yield on long-term government 
bonds (YLD) net of inflation and sovereign risk, log (natural) of exchange rate volatility (EXCH), log of bond market development (BDEV), protection of property rights (PROP), capital openness (CAPOP), and 
country risk (CRISK). Familiarity Factors include log of kilometer distance between countries (DIST), common language (COMLA) dummy, average bilateral trade weight assigned by partner countries (BILTR), 
uncertainty avoidance (UNTAV) of source country, and masculinity (MASC) of source country. INSB equals one minus home bias of source country i and controls for the obvious impact of country i¶VGRPHVWLFELDV
All variables are constructed or sourced as reported in Table 1. All models report results with the standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity at panel level using White (1980) method. Data is for years 2001 to 
2012. Statistical significance is reported against 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) significance levels. t-statistics are shown in parenthesis. 
 Model I 
EMU Countries 
Model II 
Interaction with GIIPS 
ECrisis -1.20*** -1.10*** 
 (-5.80) (-4.16) 
   
GCrisis 0.18 0.25 
 (0.87) (1.23) 
   
GIIPSCr  -0.36* 
  (-1.95) 
   
GIIPS  0.44 
  (1.36) 
   
YLD 0.03 0.03 
 (1.39) (1.53) 
   
EXCH -0.18 -0.10 
 (-0.51) (-0.28) 
   
BDEV 0.90*** 0.86*** 
 (6.61) (6.04) 
   
PROP 0.35*** 0.45*** 
 (4.43) (3.91) 
   
CAPOP 0.10** 0.10** 
 (2.46) (2.50) 
   
CRISK -0.70*** -0.71*** 
 (-5.65) (-5.71) 
   
DIST -2.27*** -2.27*** 
 (-26.11) (-26.22) 
   
COMLA  0.30 0.36 
 (1.22) (1.43) 
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BILTR 0.04*** 0.03*** 
 (3.40) (2.95) 
   
UNTAV -0.03*** -0.03*** 
 (-8.71) (-8.81) 
   
MASC 0.02** 0.02** 
 (2.19) (2.25) 
   
INSB 0.48*** 0.48*** 
 (10.01) (9.91) 
   
Host Country Fixed YES YES 
   
Constant -6.03*** -7.17*** 
 (-3.85) (-4.05) 
Adjusted R 2 0.32 0.32 
Observations 4581 4581 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
